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This dissertation is about fairness and the role it plays in political and personal
morality. Specifically, I investigate when it is appropriate to rely on considerations of
fairness to draw substantive conclusions about what we should do.
In Chapter 1 ("Numbers, Fairness and Beneficence") I discuss the "numbers
problem," the problem of explaining why you should save more people rather than fewer
when forced to choose. Existing non-consequentialist approaches to the problem
appeal to fairness to explain why. I argue that this is a mistake and that we can give a
more satisfying answer by appealing to requirements of beneficence or generosity.
In Chapter 2 ("Fairness, Distributive Justice and Global Justice") I discuss justice
in the distribution of resources, both within states and across different states. On one
influential view, it is always unjust for one person to have less than another through no
fault of her own. State borders, on this account, have no importance in determining
which distributions are just.
I show that an alternative approach is needed. I argue that distributions of wealth
are only unjust in so far as they issue from unfair treatment. It follows that not all
inequalities in the distribution of goods are unjust. I use these results to explain how
state borders do play a role in determining which inequalities are unjust, since some of
these inequalities issue from unfair treatment of citizens by the state.
In Chapter 3 ("Contractualism, Politics and Morality") I discuss Rawls'
contractualist theory of social justice and Scanlon's extension of it to provide a theory of
"rightness", or morality more generally. I argue that while there is some justification for
adopting a contractualist theory of social justice, this justification does not support a
contractualist theory of rightness. This is because social justice is centrally a matter of
cooperative fairness whereas rightness is not.
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Chapter 1: Numbers, Fairness and Beneficence
1.
Suppose you find yourself in the following "tradeoff' situation.
Tradeoff: you own a life saving drug which you can give away at only
small cost to yourself. "Six people will all certainly die if they are not
treated with the drug. But one of the six requires all of the drug if he is
to survive. Each of the other five requires only one-fifth of the drug."'
All six persons are strangers to you.
What should you do? The costs to you of giving away the drug are low, so you
should certainly do so. But to whom should you give it? Nearly all of us judge that you
ought to save the five people who require only one fifth of the drug. The 'numbers
problem" is the problem of saying why it is that you ought to save the five.
Consequentialists, and those sympathetic to consequentialism, are thought to
have an easy time answering this question. They endorse the principle that one ought
to act in the way that brings about the best possible state of affairs. Applying this
principle, they say that you should save the five because doing so will bring about a
' The case is from Taurek (1977), p.293.
better state of affairs than saving one. But many philosophers reject the
consequentialist principle. They claim, for instance, that it makes implausible
predictions about what one ought to do or that the notion of "bettemess" that it employs
is unintelligible.
For these non-consequentialist philosophers, the numbers problem is thought to
be very hard. In this paper I am going to ask whether this is true. I am going to look at
what answers you can give to the numbers problem if you are a non-consequentialist.
That is, I am going to consider what answers you can give without appealing to the
goodness of states of affairs.
The standard non-consequentialist accounts try to answer the problem by
appealing to fairness. According to these accounts, you ought to save the five because
this is the only way to treat each needy person fairly. If you fail to save the five, they
say, then there is at least one member of the five that you will have treated unfairly.
I think this approach is radically mistaken. Appealing to fairness will not allow us
to explain why you should save more and, furthermore, considerations of fairness are
irrelevant in cases such as Tradeoff. What morality centrally requires of us in Tradeoff is
that we be beneficent, or act in ways that show regard for the needs of others. I think
the beneficent thing to do is to save the five, and will show why.
I will proceed as follows. I first show some prima facie problems with appealing
to fairness to justify saving five (section 2) and then argue that recent accounts have not
surmounted these problems (section 3). In section 4, I argue that, furthermore, fairness
is irrelevant in a case such as Tradeoff. In section 5 I offer my own account of why you
should save the greater number in Tradeoff. Failing to save the greater number, I claim,
would be unbeneficent. In section 6, I consider choices between lives of a different
kind, where fairness plausibly does have some role to play in explaining why we should
save the many and argue that there are distinctive reason why, in these cases, fairness
may require saving more.
2.
The standard non-consequentialist approaches to the numbers problem begin
with the idea that one must respond fairly to those who need your aid.2 So, I am going
to begin by considering the idea of fairness in our dealings with others.
We appeal to fairness frequently in our everyday life. For instance, suppose that
a parent provides more help to one of her children than another. This seems to be
unfair treatment of the less favoured child. Suppose that a firm pays its female workers
less than male workers who do the same jobs. This would be considered unfair
treatment of the female employees. Or, suppose that grants for scientific research
never go to members of a particular race. We would think candidates of that race are
being treated unfairly.
Fairness in this sense is a requirement on how we treat others. It is comparative:
it concerns how we treat some people compared with how we treat others. It requires,
2 For instance, Kamm (2007), Chap. 2; Otsuka (2006) and Hsieh et al. (2006).
roughly, that we treat all relevantly similar persons similarly.3 Thus, the children who are
each equally in need of the parent's help should be given the same assistance,
employees doing similar jobs should be similarly compensated and so on. Where we
are providing benefits, fairness demands, more specifically, that we benefit people in
proportion to their eligibility for the benefit. Thus, variations in the size of grants should
be in proportion to how qualified their recipients are.
Some ethical theories deny that fairness has any fundamental importance.
Utilitarians, for instance, deny that one is ever bound by a requirement of fairness.4
They do think that we should sometimes act as fairness would demand, say by helping
our children equally, but only when, and because, so acting would increase aggregate
utility, not because it would be fair.
According to the standard non-consequentialist accounts of the numbers
problem, we are required to be fair in giving aid to needy strangers. They appeal to this
general requirement that we be fair to the needy in order to explain why you should save
the many in a case such as Tradeoff. But before looking at why exactly they think
fairness requires you to save the many, I am going to briefly discuss some prima facie
difficulties with showing that it is fair to save the five. It will be useful to consider these
initial difficulities, since they will help us to understand the arguments for thinking that
3 Broome (1990-91) characterizes fairness in this way; Hsieh, et al. (2006) similarly write that "if people
are the same in morally relevant respects, then they deserve to be treated in the same way," p.353. The
principle that likes be treated alike is found in Aristotle (2002) Nich. Ethics V. 3.
4 It might be said that utilitarians try to capture a very abstract sense of "fairness" in saying that a unit of
utility has the same value whoever experiences it, be they black, white, young, old, etc. It would still be
true that utilitarians reject appeals to "fairness" in the everyday sense that we are concerned with.
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saving five is fair and will also help to illuminate some of the problems with that view.
So, what must we do in order to be fair in giving aid to strangers? I said that
fairness requires treating all relevantly similar individuals similarly. Plausibly, when we
are giving out aid to needy strangers, the only relevant characteristic of any individual is
the extent of her need. That is, the only thing that makes one needy person more
eligible for our help than another is the extent of her need. Thus, fairness requires that
we help each needy person in proportion to her need. Where needs are equal, fairness
requires us to help each needy person equally.
In Tradeoff, those you can aid are equally needy. But it is impossible for you to
help each of them to the same degree. The only help you can provide for any candidate
is saving her life, but it is impossible for you to save each person's life.
It is thus very tempting to conclude that in such a case there is no way to act
fairly, since we cannot give the same help to every candidate. If that is true, then we
should simply abandon the appeal to fairness to justify saving the greater number. We
would then have to justify saving the greater number on some other grounds. This the
first problem I will mention for any account that appeals to fairness: Tradeoff seems
plausibly to be a case where fairness simply cannot be achieved.
The second problem is that to the extent that fairness can be achieved, it seems
to require not saving the greater number, but, instead, giving each candidate an equal
chance of being saved. The fairest thing we can do, plausibly, is what Taurek proposed,
namely tossing a coin to pick between saving the one or the five.5 Here is why:
5 Taurek's proposal is in Taurek (1977). The defense of Taurek that I offer draws heavily on Broome
I said that, in general, fairness seems to require giving equally needy persons
equal help, and that doing that is impossible here. Even so, we can still try to fulfill the
basic requirement of fairness, which is to treat relevantly similarly people similarly.
Rather than giving each candidate the same amount of help, we can, as a proxy, give
each candidate an equal chance of being helped. We can thus treat each candidate
similarly by giving each the same chance of getting our aid. We can do this by using a
coin toss to make our decision about whether to save one or five, thereby giving each
person a fifty percent chance of being saved. If this line of reasoning is correct, then the
fairest thing to do in the circumstances is not to save the greater number, but, instead, to
toss a coin to decide whether to save one or five.
Thus, appealing to fairness to justify saving the greater number seems
problematic. Initial investigation suggests, firstly, that it might be impossible to be fair in
these cases and, secondly, that the best approximation of fairness seems to be not
saving the greater number but tossing a coin to decide whom to save.
These problems are well known and recent non-consequentialist accounts
operate against this background. They attempt to show that, despite appearances, one
can be fair in tradeoff cases and that, contrary to Taurek, fairness requires saving the
greater number. I am going to briefly illustrate the most prominent of these recent
accounts, namely Francis Kamm's, and the problems that any such account faces.
3.
(1990-91).
Kamm claims, as does Taurek, that we ought to toss a coin if we are faced with a
choice between saving a single person A and another person B (and all else is equal).
This would be fair, they agree, because it would give each person a fifty percent chance
of being saved and so each person would be treated the same way.
Where Kamm and Taurek differ is that Taurek would still use a coin if faced with a
choice between saving person A and saving two other people B and C, whilst Kamm
would save B and C. Taurek would toss coin between saving A and saving B and C in
order to give each of A, B and C an equal (fifty percent) chance of being saved.
Kamm objects that in using a coin toss he would be proceeding just as if the
choice were between saving A and just the individual B, rather than a choice between
saving A or saving B and C. The presence of the additional person C would be making
no difference to his actions. C could complain that she has been treated unfairly, Kamm
claims, since her "presence does not make any difference to the outcome". 6
As it stands, this objection to Taurek is very unpersuasive.' The mere fact that
Taurek would perform a certain action whether or not a particular person is present
does not show that said person has been treated unfairly. For, Kamm herself must
agree that there are cases where one should perform the same action whether or not
some individual is present and that, in these cases, so acting is not unfair. For instance,
suppose that I can easily save five people and I decide to do so. I might now discover
6 Kamm (2007), p.55.
7 Raz (2003), p.362 makes a similar point in discussing Scanlon.
that there is a different single individual whom I could save instead of the initial five. On
Kamm's view, I should still go ahead and save the five; the presence of the other single
individual should make no difference to what I do. She does not think acting in this way
is unfair.
Thus, both Taurek and Kamm agree that only sometimes should the presence of
some particular individual make a difference to how we act. So the important question
is whether the presence of C should make a difference in the particular case we are
concerned with. Kamm thinks that it should. She thinks that someone who is prepared
to toss a coin whether or not C is present treats C unfairly. To proceed in this way, she
claims, would be unfair because it would give no significance to C's need.8 Kamm's
suggestion is that if we toss a coin when we can either save A or save B and C, this will
be unfair to C because her presence will not have been taken into account in our
decision making.
Is this a reasonable objection to Taurek? It all depends on what we have to do to
take into account the presence of person C. Kamm is assuming that in this situation we
must be fair to each needy person. So, on her view, taking into account C's need in this
situation should just be a matter of giving her whatever help she can fairly demand.
But, as we have seen, there is an argument Taurek can offer for thinking that
treating C fairly just requires giving her an equal chance of being saved. Since A and B
are just as needy as she is, C can demand no more, as a matter of fairness, than to be
treated the same as they are. As a matter of fairness, Taurek can say, giving C an
8 Kamm (2007), p. 33.
equal chance is the appropriate way to take account of her need.9 So more needs to be
said if Kamm is to show that C is being treated unfairly.
Kamm needs to show that fairness to C requires us to actually save her rather
than just give her an equal chance of being saved. But it is difficult to see how she
could establish this. I said that fairness requires treating all similarly eligible candidates
for a good similarly. We can only give a candidate for a good more of it on grounds of
fairness if she herself is more eligible for the good. For instance, suppose grants are
being given out to researchers. If we are going to give one candidate a bigger grant
than others on grounds of fairness, we have to show that she is better qualified or
otherwise more eligible for funding than her competitors.
Now, Kamm believes that when just A and B's lives are at stake, each is equally
eligible for your help and should be given an equal chance of getting it. But she thinks
that when B is joined by another person C, such that we can either save A or save B
and C, suddenly fairness requires giving no chance of aid to A and giving all your aid to
B and C. So Kamm must claim that when C can be saved along with B, C is suddenly
more eligible for your help than A. Kamm needs to give reasons for thinking that, in this
case, C is relevantly different from A, such that C is more eligible for your help than A is.
It is hard to see what these reasons could be. A and C both stand to lose their
lives. The only difference between them is that C can be saved along with B. But this
does not seem to make C herself any more eligible for receiving help than A. It is thus
hard to see why it would be unfair to C to not save her and it is hard to see why it would
9 Otsuka (2006) presents essentially this point on Taurek's behalf.
not be unfair to A to give him no help or chance of help.
Thus, Kamm's project of trying to show that we wrong C if we do not save B and
C over A faces some serious difficulties. It is hard to see what could make C more
eligible for help in this case than A, and so it is hard to see why fairness requires us to
give more help to C than to A. Kamm has not provided an answer to the challenges I
presented in the previous section since she has not shown that fairness can be done in
Tradeoff or that it would require saving the greater number rather than tossing a coin.
4.
So any account that appeals to fairness faces serious difficulties in explaining
why you should save the greater number. But I think there is a further fundamental
problem with appealing to fairness in these contexts. I think that it is not the case that in
a situation such as Tradeoff one is required to be fair. I am not suggesting that we
should act unfairly in these cases but, rather, that considerations of fairness do not
apply there at all. Saving the greater number in this case, I think, is neither required by
fairness nor ruled out by fairness.
It seems to me that our that dealings with needy strangers are in general
unconstrained by fairness. For instance, consider the following case,
Charities: various people stop me on the street and ask me to donate to
their charities, each of which is engaged in life saving activities in a
different area of the world. Each is only asking for a small contribution
but that contribution will help save a life.
Each of these charities, and the people they serve, is equally worthy of my aid.
Yet, it is perfectly permissible for me to just pick one of these charities and give all of my
aid to them. We do not think that I must divide my aid equally between them or find
some way of giving each charity an equal chance of receiving my aid. I can just pick
where my aid is going to go.
What I just said is slightly too strong because some ways of picking where to
send my aid do seem morally abhorrent. For instance, suppose I think that members of
race R are inferior and, on this basis, only ever give aid to parts of the world where
members of race R are scarce. This would be morally unacceptable. It might be said
that we should condemn this because it would be unfair to members of that race and
hence that our charitable donations really are constrained by fairness.
I do not think appealing to fairness provides a very good explanation for why it is
wrong to choose in this way. For instance, suppose again that I only give to aid to parts
of the world where race R is scarce but that the reason why I do so is not connected to
any views about racial superiority. Rather, I am just a creature of habit and tend to
always give my aid to people in some other part of the world, where there is just as
much need. Acting in this way does not seem morally unacceptable, so I do not think
that fairness requires us to give equal aid, or equal chances of aid, to members of
different races.
What is wrong with giving out one's aid with racist motivations is not that it results
in distributing one's aid unfairly. A better explanation for what is wrong with the racist's
aid decisions is just that acting on racist motivations is always wrong, even when
considerations of fairness are not applicable.
So our intuitions do suggest that requirements of fairness are not present when
we are giving aid to strangers. But can we explain why? Can we give some rationale
for denying that aid to strangers is subject to fairness?
It seems to me that fairness only comes into play where others have rights
against us. Teachers owe it to their students to provide them with education, parents
owe it to their children to care for them, members in good standing of a squash club are
owed the benefits the club provides. All of these are cases where we think fairness is
required. In each of these cases, there are individuals with similar rights and so fairness
comes into play and requires that they are treated similarly.
By contrast, no restaurant, say, has a right that I attend it or even consider
attending it. This provides an explanation for why I am not required to be fair in my
decisions about where to eat and can frequent some restaurants more than others as I
please.
Thus, a potential explanation for why fairness is not relevant to aid is that needy
strangers do not have rights to our aid.
Is it true that needy strangers have no rights to our aid? This is a difficult and
long debated question which I cannot fully address here, but I think there is a good case
for thinking that they do not. For instance, we think it perfectly acceptable to not help
some needy persons on the grounds that we have been helping others a lot previously.
If individuals had rights to our aid, this sort of justification would not be acceptable. 10
For instance, since I owe it to you to keep my promises, I cannot justify breaking this
promise to you on the grounds that I have previously kept many promises made to
others. Your right that I keep my promise is not affected by what I have done for others.
Aid is clearly different and a good explanation of why it is different is that no one has
rights to our aid.
It might be said that even though needy strangers do not in general have rights to
our aid, there are special circumstances where they do and, it might be said, Tradeoff is
one of those circumstances.11 More specifically, it might be said that individuals have
rights to our aid only when the costs to us of providing the aid are low and there is no-
one else around who can provide it. Tradeoff is such a case, so perhaps the individuals
in Tradeoff do have rights to your aid.
I think this suggestion is implausible. Rights do not ordinarily go in and out of
existence depending on the costs to us of fulfilling them. For instance, suppose you
were no threat to me but killing you was the only way to save my life (say, the Mafia
have said they will kill me if I do not assassinate you). You would still have a right to life
against me despite the extremely high costs to me of not infringing that right. We
10 I owe this point to Judith Jarvis Thomson.
" Hsieh, et al. (2006) make a proposal similar to this in Section 5.
should thus doubt that the needy persons in Tradeoff have a right to your pill which
appears only because the costs to you of giving the pill away are low.
It seems to me that in Tradeoff the only person who has a right to the pill is you.
After all, you own it. If, say, someone stole the pill to give it to the needy, they would
infringe your right to it and have to compensate you and so on.
All the same, you should give it away. It would not only be praiseworthy for you
to do so, you are morally required to. I think this fact, that you are morally required to
give away your pill, is the source of the temptation to suppose that the needy in Tradeoff
have rights to that pill. To dispell that temptation, one needs to show that there is some
other explanation for why you are morally required to give away your pill.12 I show this in
the next section.
5.
The appeal to rights and fairness to deal with cases such as Tradeoff seems to
me to not only make the wrong predictions but also to simply ignore the most natural
concepts to employ. Think about ordinary situations where private persons fail to
provide for the needy and we think morality requires them to.
Consider, for instance, someone who does not stop to help a fallen biker out of
the road, someone who refuses to help look for a missing child or someone who never
12 Thomson (1990) emphasizes that someone's having a right that you do A is neither necessary nor
sufficient for it to be the case that you ought to do A.
gives to charity. All of these people seem to me to have acted in ways that are morally
wrong, at least assuming the costs to them of aiding are not excessively high and they
have not been giving a lot of aid in the past. But we would not criticize them as rights
violators or as failing to be fair. Rather, we criticize them for being uncharitable, selfish,
callous, unbeneficent, insensitive or similar. It seems to me that we use the latter
concepts to describe a very different sort of moral failing to the failure to fulfill people's
rights or to be fair.1 We thus need to recognize that a very different sort of moral
requirement applies in these cases.
The most general term I can find for this sort of moral requirement is
"beneficence". The examples I gave are cases where people fail to be beneficent and
thereby do something morally wrong. The cases illustrate that beneficence is morally
required of us. We are not required to be heroically beneficent, traveling the world to
alleviate suffering or running into burning buildings. Doing so is typically morally
praiseworthy, but beyond what morality requires. Being beneficent is morally required.
Situations where we can provide aid to the suffering at little cost seem to be clear cases
where to not help would be morally wrong. We need not appeal to rights to explain why
this would be wrong. A perfectly good explanation is that it would unbeneficent to not
aid in these cases.
We have seen that requirements of beneficence feature heavily in our everyday
moral thinking. These requirements could be treated quite differently within different
"3 Foot (2002) also emphasizes the distinction between requirements of "justice," or satisfying rights,
and of "charity".
non-consequentialist theories. Within a deontological theory, such as that of Ross, one
could treat requirements of beneficence as pro tanto moral duties. Within a virtue
theory, one could link failures of beneficence to broader defects of character such as
unkindness. I am not going to consider here which of these theories is correct or how to
develop it. It seems to me that any acceptable non-consequentialist moral theory ought
to include some category of requirements of beneficence and I will proceed under that
assumption.
We saw earlier that we cannot explain why it is wrong to not save five in Tradeoff
by appealing to fairness or rights. I think we can give a better explanation by appealing
to requirements of beneficence instead. 14 To see this, let's look at some kinds of failure
to be beneficent.
One way to be unbeneficent is to be stingy or ungenerous in providing aid. In
these cases, one is unbeneficent because one gives away fewer resources than one
ought to. For instance, suppose that I see a man by the side of the road with a broken
leg. 'Tve been lying here for hours in the heat," he says, "please give me a drop of
water." You recognize his need, but, you think, "if I keep all of the water in my bottle I
could use it to fix my hair better when I get back to the car."
This would be profoundly stingy or ungenerous because I would be hoarding my
resources for myself in the face of great need.
But this doesn't seem to me to be the only way to be unbeneficent. Another way
14 Foot (2002) similarly proposes that charity requires us to save the many, although she says little about
why.
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is to not be appropriately sensitive to the good of some person, quite irrespective of the
gains to oneself. In these cases one acts in ways that are callously insensitive to what
is good for some other person(s), even though there is no benefit to oneself of doing so.
This is unbeneficent because it shows a callous insensitivity to the good of those
persons. Consider the following example.
Easy Split: Ihave a pill, of little use to me, with which I can save someone's
life. I decide to give it to him. Now I discover that this person only needs
half the pill to save him, and so I can split it and save the life of an
additional person with the remaining half. But, I don't bother splitting it. I
just give the whole thing to the one.
It does not seem that my behavior in such a case would be stingy or ungenerous.
I am not withholding any of my resources for my own benefit. Rather, in failing to split
the pill, I can be accused of being callously insensitive to the good of the additional
person whose life I could save.
I have two options which are in all respects equivalent except for the fact that if I
choose one of the options P will die, whereas if I choose the other option P will live. I
should treat the fact that I would save P as a decisive reason for choosing the option of
splitting the pill. To not do so would be to show a callous insensitivity to the good of P.
To show such insensitivity to need seems unbeneficent to me. So, we can criticize
people for being unbeneficent, not just for hoarding their resources, but also for giving
their resources away in a manner that does not show appropriate regard for the good of
some persons.
Someone who saves one rather than five in Tradeoff also cannot be accused of
hoarding their resources. Furthermore, Tradeoff is importantly different to Easy Split
because in Tradeoff one is faced with a choice between saving two different sets of
people rather than a choice between saving one person or saving that person plus an
extra person. Still, I think we can appeal to beneficence in Tradeoff too; I think that
someone acts unbenficently if they do not save the many in Tradeoff. I think someone
who does not save the greater number in Tradeoff shows a callous insensitivity to the
good of the extra people they could save. For, in choosing to give the pill to the one,
they must not be giving proper consideration to the good of the extra people they could
save. All of this seems very intuitive to me. But I think the following line of reasoning
may make it clearer.
Suppose I am holidaying on my boat and I notice two people, A and B, drowning.
If I sail to my left, then I will be able to easily save A and if I sail to my right, then I will be
able to easily save B. But there is not enough time to save both.
It would certainly be unbeneficent to not take a few minutes out of my holiday to
save one of these people. It is up to me, though, to decide which of them to save.
Morality permits me to sail left or to sail right, so I can just pick which way to go.
Why am I allowed to just pick whether to sail left or right? I think this is because,
as a matter of beneficence, the two options are equally acceptable. Someone
reponding beneficently to the circumstances would be equally satisfied with saving A as
with saving B. The beneficent person would see that each stands to lose his life and will
be equally satisfied with saving either one.
Suppose I now discover that if I sail to my right I will be able to pick up an
additional person, C, once I have saved B. Should I save person A alone, or should I
save B and then this additional person C? Should I sail left or right?
As we have seen, taking into account just the needs of A and B, beneficence
requires us to sail either right or left - each option is equally acceptable. The only
remaining consideration is the additional presence of C on the right. That fact that C
can be saved if I sail right is the only relevant difference between sailing right and sailing
left. Beneficence surely requires me to take this difference into account and sail to the
right.
To not take account of C in this way would show a callous insensitivity to her
good. This is a situation where all else is equal except for the fact that C's life can be
saved if I sail right rather than left. We saw, in my discussion of Easy Split that, where
all else is equal, one ought to save a person's life where one can do so at no extra cost.
To not do so is to is show a callous insensitivity to her good. So, to not sail right, in
order to save C as well as B, would show a callous insensitivity to C's good.
Showing such a lack of sensitivity to someone's good, as I suggested earlier, is
unbeneficent. So it is unbeneficent to not save B and C. Similar reasoning might be
employed in any case where we face trade-offs between similarly needy persons. In
any such case, it would be unbeneficent to not save the greater number because it
would show a callous lack of sensitivity to the good of the extra persons who would be
saved if one helped the greater number.
Now, the reasoning I have employed is very similar to some suggestions made
by Kamm and subsequent non-consequentialists." s But their accounts differ crucially, as
we have seen, because they are appealing to fairness and this makes it impossible for
them to argue as I have done.
For instance, I relied on the claim that it is permissible, given a choice between
saving A or saving B, to choose to save either because saving either is just as
beneficent. But just picking between A and B is not permissible where fairness is
required. Fairness would require us to put in place a procedure, such as coin toss, that
ensures each of A and B will get an equal chance of aid.16
Also, I claimed that when we can save C along with B, we should take C's
presence into account by treating it as a reason to sail right rather than left. To not do
so would show a callous lack of sensitivity to C's need. Fairness would require taking
C's presence into account in a very different way, making sure that she received the
same treatment as A and B, perhaps by giving her an equal chance to be saved. On my
account there is no such requirement of fair treatment in this case and so it is
'S Most fully in Kamm (2007), Chapt. 2. Scanlon repeats some of Kamm's ideas in Scanlon (1998),
Chapt. 5.
16 Is "just picking" genuinely different from putting in place such a procedure? To see the difference
consider two ways you might select a can of soup at the market. On the one hand, you might put in
place a procedure designed to ensure that there is an equal chance of your selecting any given can,
such as a can lottery. But you could just grab a can from the shelf, taking no steps to ensure that the
other cans get a chance of being selected. You could just pick one.
permissible to just sail right rather than left on account of C's life.
More generally, fairness accounts face an objection that my account does not.
When we save the greater number, we give help to C and no help to A. Fairness
requires that we treat all similarly eligible candidates for a good similarly. Thus, in order
to justify saving the many on grounds of fairness, one must be able to say what makes
C more eligible for the good than A. We saw earlier that doing so is very difficult. Once
we abandon the appeal to fairness, we no longer need to explain why our choice treats
each candidate similarly and hence do not need to claim that C is more eligible for the
good than A. Thus, my account does not face the problem that fairness accounts face.
I thus conclude that it is wrong to save the lesser number in cases such as
Tradeoff because to do so would be unbeneficent. It would be unbeneficent because it
would show a callous insensitivity to the good of some persons.
6.
Before proceeding, I would like to consider some potential objections.
Many people worry that the answer one gives to the numbers problem will be
inconsistent with some other firmly held convictions of ours. They note that we have a
firm intuition that, faced with a choice between saving a single individual from death and
a million people from tiny headaches, one should save the single individual. Their
concern is that one's answer to the numbers problem will undermine this intuition."
I cannot fully address these cases here. However, I think they do not provide a
17 Ostuka (2006) raises concerns of this kind.
direct challenge to my account, since my account leaves open whether you should cure
the many headaches rather than save a life. I have claimed that it is uncharitable to
save one person rather than five because to do so would show a lack of concern for the
additional lives one could save by helping the five. I defended this claim by noting that
faced with a choice between saving one person A, and another person B, it is just as
beneficent to save either person.
A choice between saving one person's life and curing another's headache is very
different. I suspect most people would not think it is just as beneficent to cure the
headache as to save the life. So the explanation I offered for why it is unbeneficent to
save one life rather than five cannot be directly used to argue that it would be
unbeneficent to save one person's life rather than cure the headaches of a million
others. My account of the numbers problem leaves open the question of whether you
should save the single life over the many headaches.
As I said in the introduction, the numbers problem is the problem of giving a non-
consequentialist explanation for why we should save the greater number. Some may
question whether the explanation I have given is a genuine alternative to the
consequentialist one. So, I would like to briefly clarify the respect in which my
explanation differs from the one offered by the consequentialist.
My explanation, like the consequentialist one, relies in part on considerations
about what would be good for certain people. But it does not, like the consequentialist
one, turn on facts about the goodness of states of affairs. Rather, facts about what
would be good for people matter in my account because they affect what it would be
beneficent or generous for an agent to do.
It might be said that we can only understand what it is for someone to be
beneficent or generous in terms of what would promote the best states of affairs. But I
reject this. It seems to me that the idea of beneficence, and associated notions of
charity, generosity and so on, are familiar concepts from our common sense morality.
We have a perfectly good grip on them, it seems to me, without having to bring in any
notion of good states of affairs.
Of course, the consequentialist can claim that the best explanation for why we
should be beneficent is that doing so will produce the best states of affairs. But in so far
as we have reason to reject consequentialism, in light of the familiar objections I
mentioned at the outset, we also have reason to reject this explanation.
7.
I have been discussing only Tradeoff and similar cases where the agent with aid
to give is a private person and the needy are strangers to her. I proposed that in such
cases the needy have no rights to that aid and that considerations of fairness are
irrelevant. For these cases, the explanation of why one should save the five appeals to
beneficence. Still, it seems to me that there are some important cases where we should
save the greater number but where it seems inappropriate to appeal to beneficence and
considerations of fairness are relevant. Before concluding, I would like to briefly discuss
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some of these cases and show that they are not in tension with my account.
Consider, for instance, agents of the state, such as firefighters, public health
officials and so on. These agents are frequently required to save the lives of these
people and find themselves in tradeoff situations where they can save, say, only one
person or five but not both. For instance, a firefighter might find herself in a situation
where she can save one person in one wing of a building, or five others in another wing,
but not both.
The firefighter, we think, ought to save the five. Why is this? One explanation is
that it would be unbeneficent of the firefighter to not save five and, for the reasons I
gave earlier, I think it would indeed be unbeneficent of her to not save five. But this
does not seem to me to be the only or central explanation of why she should save the
five. It seems to me that the firefighter owes it to the five to save them.
This might seems puzzling because, given that both firefighters and private
persons should save the greater number, we might expect the explanation of why they
should to be the same. I do not find this very troubling, however, since the reasons why
firefighters are required to put out fires in general seem quite different from the reasons
why a private person might be required to put out a fire. Although firefighters should
also save the greater number, other aspects of their responsibilities to aid reveal
important differences between them and private persons.
For instance, we think firefighters are morally required to go into burning
buildings to save people, despite the personal risk of doing so, when we would not think
private persons were required to. Also, when a private person is able to save five rather
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than one but the one is her friend we think it perfectly permissible for her to save the
one. 8 But firefighters are not permitted to show such partiality.
These differences can be accounted for by the fact that private individuals are
required to provide aid as a matter of beneficence, whereas firefighters owe it to us to
do their job of putting out fires. There thus seems to me every reason to expect that the
central explanation for why firefighters should save the greater number will be quite
different.
I said the central explanation for why firefighters should save more seems to be
that saving more is part of what they owe. But why is it part of what they owe?
The natural answer is surely that it is typically part of their job to save more rather
than fewer. This answer suggests that the obligations of firefighters are fixed by the
responsibilities that they are assigned by the state. Their obligations are fixed by what
policy the state chooses about how firefighters are to react in different circumstances.
So, a perfectly good explanation of why a particular firefighter should save the greater
number refers to the policy that she has been asked to follow.
There is a further question we can ask about these cases, namely what policy
should be enacted. What rule should the state tell firefighters to follow when they find
themselves faced with forced choices between lives?
We think the state has a duty, indeed the same duty, to every citizen to provide
her with protection from fire. In coming up with a policy for its firefighters, the state is not
distributing the good of fire protection to any particular person. It is not telling them to
8 Taurek (1977) points this out.
quell any particular fire, but instructing them about what to do when certain situations
arise. In coming up with a policy, the state is thus determining what would happen to
any given citizen should they find themselves in the relevant circumstances. The state's
decisions will thus determine what the chances are of any given citizen getting helped if
they find themselves in need of it.
Suppose the state is deciding between the policy of saving the greater number
and the policy of tossing a coin to decide between saving more or fewer people. A
randomly selected citizen has a higher chance of being among the greater number. So
the choice between these policies is just a choice between giving every citizen a higher
chance of being saved or a lower chance. 19
Thus, the policy of saving the greater number seems to be fair, since every
citizen's chances of being saved is raised. Each person is treated the same by a policy
which raises each person's chances of being saved.
There are other policies that also give person the same chance of being saved,
such as the policy of tossing a coin. But the policy of saving the greater number is more
attractive because it gives each person the highest possible chance of being saved
(consistent with everyone else getting the same). Given that the state is obligated to
provide care for its citizens, surely it ought, all else being equal, to choose the policy
which benefits them the most and this is the policy of saving the greater number.
So, it seems to me that the right way to explain why firefighters, lifeguards, etc.
19 This argument draws on Taurek (1977). His discussion has been interpreted in different ways but I
think the argument I give is the strongest version of the one he offers.
should save the greater number is to refer to the responsibilities they have been
assigned by state policies. We can ask whether such policies are themselves justified
given what the state owes to its citizens, and I think it is clear that they are.
8.
In conclusion, let me briefly summarize what we have found. Non-
consequentialists have assumed that we must justify saving the greater number on
grounds of fairness. This has proved very difficult and so the numbers problem has
been thought very hard for non-consequentialists.
The difficulty arises, I argued, because of the false assumption that requirements
of fairness apply in cases such as Tradeoff. This assumption is false because we are
not required to be fair in giving aid to needy strangers. Fairness does not apply to these
actions because needy strangers do not have rights to our aid.
Once we abandon the assumption that fairness is required of us in these cases,
we can justify saving the greater number much more easily and intuitively on the
grounds that it is the beneficent thing to do.
There are other cases of tradeoffs, such as those involving firefighters, lifeguards
and so on, where rights and fairness do seem relevant to the justification for saving
more. But these cases are importantly different and do not stand in tension with the rest
of my account.
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Chapter 2: Fairness, Distributive Justice and Global Justice
1.
There is, uncontroversially, some duty to help those who are living lives of great
deprivation, at least where we can do so without bearing an unreasonable burden. We
might call this a duty of "humanitarianism". This duty requires us to help those who are
living in great deprivation because they are doing so badly. It is relatively
uncontroversial that some such duty exists. For instance, there are few who would say
we needn't do anything to prevent easily avoidable starvation. However, it is rather
more controversial what the best way to fulfill this duty is, how much of a burden it
requires one to bear and so on.
This duty of humanitarianism is the minimal requirement bearing on the morality
of resource distribution. But many of us think that there are, in addition, requirements of
justice. In particular, many of us are "egalitarians". Egalitarians are not just concerned
about levels of avoidable suffering in our society, they are also concerned with its
inequalities and think that these inequalities are unjust, or unjust unless they can be
given a special justification. 20 They thus think that we should have state policies which
address these inequalities. Some familiar egalitarian policy proposals for addressing
inequality include progressive taxation, a redistributive welfare state, heavy investment
20In the rest of the paper I will sometimes drop the qualification "unless they can be given a special justification,"
but it should be assumed throughout.
in education, minimum wages and so on. Others, such as non-egalitarian liberals, may
also endorse these policies. But their justification for the policies is different. They
might say redistribution is needed to alleviate need or to place limits on the political
power any individual can gain. What distinguishes the egalitarian is that she thinks
inequality is itself unjust (absenting a special justification for it) and endorses these
policies as a means of redressing inequality.
These policies are, of course, extremely controversial in the United States and
elsewhere in the developed world. It's thus important for those attracted to
egalitarianism to have something to say in defense of their views and I'm going to begin
this paper by considering what justifications could be offered for egalitarian policies.
What argument can egalitarians give for the claim that justice requires the sort of
policies they endorse?
That question is important in its own right. But answering it is also essential for
addressing another issue that political philosophers have recently begun to focus on.
Egalitarianism, as I've described it, is a view about policies that affect the distribution of
wealth within a particular society. We can also ask about distributive justice in the
global context, about the distribution of wealth between different societies and their
members. In particular, we can ask, "Ifyou're an egalitarian about distributive justice
within a society, what should you say about global distributive justice, about distributive
justice across different societies?" As we shall see, different ways of defending
egalitarianism for the domestic sphere have very different implications for global
distributive justice.
I'm going to argue, firstly, that some prominent views about how to defend
domestic egalitarianism are mistaken and that there is a better alternative available.
Secondly, I'm going to argue that this means some central ways of thinking about global
justice are mistaken. And, finally, I will suggest how my own view about how to defend
domestic egalitarianism can be used to develop a quite different theory of global
distributive justice.
I'm not actually going to discuss every way of defending egalitarian policies.
There are many arguments philosophers have offered for egalitarian policies. For
instance, some utilitarians have suggested that the utility individuals get from resources
exhibits diminishing marginal returns and that, hence, more equal distributions of wealth
should be promoted in order to maximize aggregate utility. Others, "communitarians"
perhaps, have argued for redistribution on the grounds that it engenders more a
cohesive and sympathetic community life within a society and that only in a community
of this kind can there be stable democratic political institutions.
Though these and other justifications for egalitarianism are important, I'm going
to be more narrowly focused in this paper. I'm going to focus mainly on one particular
strand of egalitarian thought, namely that which relies centrally on the notion of fairness.
In political philosophy, that strand rose to prominence with the publication of John
Rawls' theory of "Justice as Fairness" and remains central in contemporary discussions
of distributive justice. "Fairness" is also frequently appealed to in political debate about
distribution. For instance, when Jo Biden was asked to defend the policy of raising
taxes on those earning more than $250,000 a year, he replied that this policy was
justified out of "fairness" to the middle class.
2.
The most prominent view about how fairness might figure in an argument for
egalitarian policies is "luck egalitarianism". This view is inspired by certain passages of
Rawls and Dworkin, but its central proponents include G.A. Cohen, Richard Arneson
and John Roemer.21 The core idea of luck egalitarianism is that it is unfair if one person
has less than another through sheer bad luck and that justice requires the elimination of
such unfair disadvantage. Something needs to be said about what it is for someone to
be disadvantaged through "sheer bad luck" and the most common path is to say that an
inequality is due to sheer bad luck, and hence unfair, if someone has less than others
through no fault of her own.
The idea is that if it is my fault that I'm in a position where I have less than others,
say because I made bad decisions, then I cannot say that I've just been unlucky and so
I cannot complain that it is unfair that I have less. For instance, if I've chosen to
squander my money in the arcade or set a match to it, then I can't say it's unfair that I
now have less than others. But, if it's not my fault that I have less, if I can't be held
responsible for being in that position, then it is just sheer bad luck that I have less and I
can complain that this is unfair.
Here, then, is a canonical statement of the luck egalitarian view: G.A. Cohen
21 See Cohen (1989) and (2008); Ameson (1989) and (2001) and Roemer (1994), (1996) and
(1998).
writes that his "animating conviction in political philosophy is that an unequal distribution
whose inequality cannot be vindicated by some choice or fault or desert on the part of
(some of) the relevant affected agents is unfair, and therefore, pro tanto, unjust, and
that nothing can remove that particular injustice."22 The unfairness of such inequalities,
on Cohen's view, makes a strong prima facie case for policies that aim to eradicate
them.
To defend egalitarian policies (some sort of redistributive welfare state, for
instance) on luck egalitarian grounds one needs to fill in a number of details. For
instance, one needs to say something about when exactly someone should be thought
at fault for having less than another. And having done that, a lot of empirical work
would need to be done to show that some important class of inequalities in our society
are faultless, according to the relevant standard. Filling in these details is hard and
presents serious difficulties for the luck egalitarian, but we can set these issues aside
for present purposes. Now that we have the basics of the luck egalitarian position in
view, I'm going to illustrate a more fundamental problem for the theory.
3.
Start by considering ordinary appeals to fairness in our everyday moral thinking.
One way that we talk about fairness concerns fairness in the way that people are being
treated. Here are some examples. Suppose that a parent were to neglect one of her
children for the sake of their doted on sibling. We would consider this unfair. More
22 Cohen (2008) p.7 .
specifically, we would think that the parent's treatment of the less favored child was
unfair. It is unfair for the parent to be doing so little for this child compared with the
other.
Here is another case. Suppose that within a company men earn greater wages
than women who are doing just the same work. This is surely unfair. In this case what
is unfair is the company's treatment of its employees, giving arbitrary advantages to its
male employees over female.
Finally, consider a carpool scheme where some friends cooperate to reduce the
amount of wear to their cars from traveling to work. They take turns driving each other
to work, but over time one friend consistently finds herself doing more driving than the
others. She is being treated unfairly because she is being expected to accept a greater
share of the burdens of the scheme than the others.
In each of these cases of unfairness, what is unfair is how some person or
institution is treating certain people. The moral defect is in the relation that the person
or institution has put itself in to those people. For example, in one case, the parent is
defectively in a position of doing much more for one child than the other and, in another,
the company is defectively offering a greater share of its profits to some members over
other, relevantly similar, members.
When discussing these cases of unfair treatment, we sometimes also call certain
distributions of goods unfair. For instance, when discussing the sexist company, we
might say that it is unfair that certain female members have a lesser income than certain
men. But it seems clear enough that the distribution of goods here is only thought to be
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derivatively unfair. The unfairness of the distribution derives from the unfair treatment
that the employees have been subject too.23 The primary subject of unfairness in these
cases is the way people are being treated.
Now, there is another very different kind of claim about fairness that people also
make in our everyday moral discourse. People are inclined to call certain distributions
unfair, even in circumstances where it is obvious that no-one has been treated unfairly.
We might call this "cosmic unfairness;" unfairness in the world that is independent of
how anyone is being, or has been, treated.
Take, for instance, the distribution of natural talents. Some individuals are born
with greater natural talents, or propensities to develop certain talents. They are born
with genes that dispose them to be more intelligent than others, have greater physical
strength and so on. Setting aside whether or not there is a God, no agent decided that
things should be like this. No-one selected her rather than him to have a greater natural
intelligence or seems to be responsible for the distribution being one way rather than
another.
Yet, many people call inequalities in the distribution of natural talent unfair. They
say such things as "No matter how hard I train, I'll never be as good a soccer player as
her. I just won't be able to kick the ball as hard. It's so unfair." Or they might say, "It's
completely unfair that I was born tone deaf but she was born with a wonderful ear for
23 Some may deny this and claim instead that the unfairness of the treatment involved derives from
its contribution to a distribution which is, independently, unfair. I will discuss this suggestion in
the next section.
music." Any unfainess in these cases cannot be derivative from unfairness in how
anyone has been, or is being, treated. It must be "cosmic unfairness," unfairness in the
world that is independent of how anyone has been treated.
4.
So, we have identified two quite different sorts of fairness judgements in our
common-sense morality. One set of judgements concerns how people are being
treated: judgements about fair and unfair treatment. And a second, quite different, sort
of judgment concerns cosmic unfairness: fairness in the distribution of advantages,
which is independent of how anyone has been treated.
Now, when the luck egalitarian claims that certain distributions of resources are
unfair, she is clearly speaking of cosmic unfairness. For, on her view, it is unfair for one
person to have less than another (through no fault of her own), irrespectively of whether
she has been treated unfairly. We can ask then, "Is it a good idea to rely on the notion
of cosmic unfairness to justify egalitarian policies?"
I think it is a bad idea and we can see the reason why by noticing an important
difference between claims about unfair treatment and claims about cosmic unfairness.
The difference concerns what we can justify by referring to these different kinds of
unfairness. In particular, these different kinds of unfairness play a very different role in
determining what actions ought to be performed. The difference is that there are clear
duties grounded in facts about unfair treatment while there are no such duties grounded
in facts (if they are facts) about cosmic unfairness.
All else being equal, one ought not to treat others unfairly. Or, if you like, there is
a prima facie duty to not treat others unfairly. Thus, judgments about unfair treatment
have clear implications for what we ought to do. If a person would treat others unfairly
in performing a certain action then, all else being equal, she ought not to perform that
action. For instance, take the parent who favors one child over the other, despite the
two children being similar in needs, abilities and so on. This is a case of unfair
treatment, the parent is treating the less favored child unfairly. And because it is unfair
to treat her child like this, she ought, all else being equal, not to do so. She may also
have a duty to make up for the results of previous unfair treatment.
What relation does cosmic unfairness bear to what we ought to do? Presumably,
if there is any general principle here it says that we ought, all else being equal, to
remove, or reduce, any cosmic disadvantage. Whereas the duty to correct the results
of unfair treatment falls on the agent who was being unfair, a plausible duty to correct
cosmic unfairness must fall on all agents.
Do we all have such a duty? Take the distribution of natural talents. If there is a
duty to correct cosmic unfairness, then we must all take steps to correct the unfairness
of some being born with greater natural talent than others. Of course, it would be very
difficult, and likely objectionably intrusive, to actually redistribute the natural talents
themselves. But we could instead fulfill our duty to reduce cosmic unfairness by
compensating the less talented with resources or some other good.
Must we do so? Surely not, it seems to me. The mere fact that person A is less
naturally intelligent, or gifted in some other respect, than some other person B does not
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impose on me a duty to help A rise to level of B or to compensate A with resources.
Think of any familiar instance of one person having lesser natural sporting ability,
philosophical talent, musical gifts and so on. If the person really wants to have a
greater natural ability, say their life goal is to play in the manner of their favorite violinist,
we might feel bad for them and we might, in a spirit of generosity, help them out in some
way. But helping them is surely superogatory. There is no duty to compensate for all
natural inequalities of talent.
It might be said that in the cases just discussed there is no duty to compensate
because the goods involved are not important enough. But take a case where
differences in natural talent seem to confer huge benefits. Take, for instance, the
basketball player Shaquille O'Neal. By the age of 32 O'Neal had amassed a fortune of
$222 million dollars. So, O'Neal earns many times more than the median earner. So,
this should be a paradigm case of an inequality that egalitarians will find unjust. But
why is it unjust?
The luck egalitarian might say the following: Shaq is 7'1" and blessed with many
natural gifts of dexterity, speed and so on. These natural gifts give him a much greater
earning potential than the rest of us. But it's sheer good fortune that he has those
talents and not us. Thus, it is unfair that Shaq has these talents and all the benefits
they bring. We should therefore have redistributive policies to compensate the rest of
us for Shaq's unfair advantages.
Is this a good argument for redistribution? Well there are many people who will
agree that it is unlucky, and unfair, that the rest of us lack Shaq's talents. But few will
think that this is a good reason for insisting that he, or anyone else else, must
compensate us for being less naturally gifted. As long as we think of Shaq's millions as
among the benefits of his natural gifts, there does not seem to be a good case for
making him give them up.'
Though I have no general duty to compensate for inequalities of natural talent,
there are clear cases where I should help someone who is born disadvantaged. For
instance, suppose that someone is born severely disabled and unable to lead a decent
life without assistance. I am morally required to help such a person, at least assuming
that I can do so without bearing an excessive burden. But we do not need to appeal to
any supposed cosmic unfairness to explain why I should help. We can give a better
explanation by appealing to a duty of charity, or beneficence, that requires me to aid
those who are in serious need. The reason I must help the disabled person is that she
is in serious need, not because there is a general duty to reduce the amount of cosmic
unfairness in the world.
What about cases of unfair treatment? Might they be best accounted for by a
duty to reduce cosmic unfairness? Earlier I discussed some examples of unfair
treatment, on the part of parents, companies, and so on. I said that in such cases we
sometimes call certain distributions are unfair, such as the distribution of wage income
within the firm, but that any unfairness in these distributions is derived from the unfair
24I will argue later that people such as Shaq are not wealthy just because of their natural talents but because of the ef-
fects of state decisions about how to regulate the economy and that, hence, their greater wealth can be traced to un-
fair treatment. My point here is just that the influence of natural talent on a distribution is not enough to make us
think it is unjust.
treatment of the people involved. This might be denied. It might be said that in fact
what makes the forms of treatment in these cases unfair is their effects on the
distribution of advantages and hence the amount of cosmic unfairness in the world.
For example, it might be said that inequalities of advantages between men and
women are cosmically unfair and that it is unfair for a company to pay men and women
differently because of the effect that doing so has on the amount of cosmic unfairness in
the world. In this way, a duty to reduce cosmic unfairness might be used to explain why
various forms of treatment are unfair.
I am doubtful, however, that it would be a very good explanation. Consider the
case of parents. It is unfair for a parent to favor one child over another, say by giving
them a superior education. On the proposed explanation, this is because doing so
would contribute to the amount of cosmic unfairness in the world. What makes the
parent's actions wrong, on this view, is their effect on the overall distribution of
advantages.
Now, we would judge a parent harshly for even very small differences in their
treatment of their own children, such as giving one a slightly better education than the
other. We would do this even where both children are, by average standards, well
educated. Yet, the effect of such actions on the overall distribution of advantages, and
hence cosmic unfairness, seems negligible.
It thus seems implausible to say that the strict requirement of equal treatment
within the family is derived from a duty to promote more equal distributions of resources
generally. Furthermore, if parents were subject to a more general duty to reduce
(cosmically) unfair distributions, they would have to do much more than just favor their
children equally. They would have a duty to compensate the various people that are
less advantaged than others, such as the untalented. But as we have seen, there does
not seem to be such a duty.
In some cases, fair treatment may in fact require introducing inequalities. For
instance, treating the competitors for a music prize fairly will require giving the prize to
the most talented performer even if she is better of than the other competitors. On the
assumption, held by the luck egalitarian, that no-one is at fault for being less talented
than others, giving the prize out in this way will increase the amount of faultless
inequality, and hence the amount of cosmic unfairness. So clearly this is a case where
a requirement of fair treatment is not best explained by a duty to prevent or reduce
cosmic unfairness.
I have been defending that claim while certain distributions may be cosmically
unfair, there is no duty to correct cosmic unfairness. Two considerations were
advanced in support of this claim. Firstly, there seem to mainly examples of cosmic
unfairness that we do not have to do anything about, such as inequalities in natural
talent. Secondly, the examples of wrongs that might provide evidence for such a duty
are best explained by other requirements, such as duties of beneficence or of fair
treatment, which are not themselves grounded in a duty to correct cosmic unfairness.
5.
There is a reply the luck egalitarian can make to my claims, which I would like to
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briefly consider. The luck egalitarian can point out that ordinary people are often quite
limited in the information they have about how their actions will affect the overall
distribution of advantages and also in their abilities to alter that distribution. She can
thus suggest that while people have a duty to reduce cosmic unfairness they should not
in general aim to change the overall distribution of advantages themselves. They
should not, for instance, try to correct the disadvantages faced by people who are less
talented in general. They should instead focus on reducing disadvantages faced by
people who they know a lot about and can help easily. For instance, they should focus
on ensuring that each of their children, whom they know a lot about and have easy
access to, is not disadvantaged.
This luck egalitarian reply to my arguments is similar to some of the claims
utilitarians often make in defense of their view. They too often appeal to people's
limited information and abilities to explain away some of the counter-intuitive aspects of
their view. Accordingly, there is a large literature discussing such appeals and it will not
be possible to survey all of that here. However, I will raise two problems for the luck
egalitarian reply that I think are serious.
Firstly, I am doubtful that even when we take into account people's limited
information and abilities the luck egalitarian can explain our ordinary responses to
inequalities. We have seen that the luck egalitarian can offer some reasons why
individuals should focus on correcting the disadvantages of people who are familiar and
accessible to them rather than trying to end global inequality directly. However, I don't
think this suggestion is sufficient to explain the sharply different attitudes we have to
inequalities in different contexts.
We don't think of inequalities due to natural talent as being merely difficult to
repair, we don't see any pressure to alter them. By contrast, we find gendered wage
inequalities within a company repulsive even where all members of the company earn
significantly more than the median worker. Changing these wage inequalities would
have very little impact on overall cosmic unfairness but seems like a very important
moral requirement. It is hard to see how such sharply different attitudes to inequality in
these different contexts could be justified just by appeal to limits on our information and
abilities.
Secondly, the luck egalitarian explanation for why we are concerned with
inequality in some contexts and not others seems, on its face, to focus on the wrong
facts. On the luck egalitarian proposal the only difference, morally speaking, between
my children and other children is that I know more about mine and can help them more
easily. But this conflicts with our ordinary understanding about why we must care for
our children and care for them equally. According to that ordinary understanding,
helping my children equally is not a mere means to creating a more equal global
distribution of advantages. It is something I owe to my children in light of having
accepted a responsibility to each of them to help them develop.
6.
We have seen that while some distributions of advantages may be cosmically
unfair, there is no general duty to correct these distributions. It thus seems to me that
claims of cosmic injustice are going to be a poor ground for egalitarian views about the
distribution of wealth within a state. For, egalitarians do not think that inequalities of
wealth within a state are merely unfortunate, they think those inequalities are unjust and
that the state ought, all else being equal, to do something about them. They are not
asking us to pity those with fewer resources or regret the fact that our society contains
enormous inequalities, they are asking us to endorse policies which do something about
these inequalities. Since there is no duty to correct cosmic unfairness, they cannot
appeal to cosmic unfairness to defend their view that the state ought to correct
inequalities in the distribution of wealth.
Of course, none of things I've said constitute a knock-down argument against the
luck-egalitarian position. Some people will hold steadfastly to the view that there is
pervasive cosmic unfairness and that all individuals and institutions, including the state,
have a duty to redress this unfairness. But it should be clear at least that the luck
egalitarian position is at odds with what many people think and so we quickly reach an
argumentative deadlock.
I think it's worth noting that claims about cosmic unfairness are sometimes made
in political discourse and reflecting on what role those claims play. Here is an example.
In 1977 Jimmy Carter was asked about a supreme court decision which ruled that the
federal government did not have to fund abortions for those who could not otherwise
afford them. Carter said, "There are many things in life that are unfair, that wealthy
people can afford and poor people can't. But I don't believe the federal government
should take action to try to make these opportunities exactly equal.'"' Kennedy similarly
said, fifteen years earlier, that certain inequalities are not unjust because "Life is unfair"
and many similar things have been said since.
Clearly the unfairness that Carter is speaking of is cosmic unfairness; he's trying
to convince us that the differential access of rich and poor women to abortions is just
cosmically unfair. And he is using that claim not to motivate political action to address
these inequalities but rather to justify inaction with respect to those inequalities. Here,
as elsewhere in familiar political discourse, the point of saying that an inequality is
merely cosmically unfair, a feature of the "unfairness of life," is to deny that anyone has
a responsibility to do anything about it. As an argument for equality in the public
sphere, the luck egalitarian case is unlikely to generate much success.
So, it is worth asking if there's an argument that can be given for egalitarian
policies that has more widely accepted premises than the luck egalitarian view. We
have seen that there is clearly and uncontroversially a duty to not treat people unfairly.
If egalitarian policies can be shown to be required as a matter of fair treatment then
there will be a good case for them. I thus propose, as an attractive alternative to the
luck egalitarian view, what I will call the "Fair Treatment View". According to the Fair
Treatment View, distributions of resources are unjust to the extent that they issue from
25 Carter (1977), p. 12 3 7 . I don't mean to endorse Carter's opinion here, just to note the use he
makes of the idea of cosmic unfairness. Indeed, I think he is wrong to describe inequalities
between rich and poor women as merely part of the unfairness of "life," since, as we will see, I
think inequalities in a society issue from unfair treatment.
unfair treatment of some individuals. I'm going to argue that we can defend
egalitarianism by relying, in particular, on the requirement that the state treat its citizens
fairly.
7.
First, though, let me say a few words about fair treatment more generally and
what it might involve. Fairness seems to be a comparative notion; it concerns how
some people are treated compared with others. When we claim that someone is being
unfairly treated, we usually offer as evidence some difference in how they are being
treated compared with others. For instance, those who think that their company is
remunerating them in an unfair manner will point out that other, similarly productive,
members of the company are being more handsomely reward. What is unfair here is
that the company is favoring some members over others, despite there being no
relevant different between them.
More generally, we can say that unfair treatment exists where an agent or
institution favors some people over others where there is no relevant difference
between them. Which differences between people are relevant? This seems to me to
vary according to the situation we are considering. Parents should do more or less for
their children depending on their needs. The person awarding music prizes should
favor the candidates who produced better performances. The members of a car pool
should receive the benefits of the scheme in proportion to their contributions. In these
different contexts, different features of the people involved are relevant: their needs,
abilities, contributions and so on.
So it seems that what counts as inappropriate favoring, and which differences
between people are relevant, depends a good deal on what situation and, especially,
what agents or institutions, we are considering. In particular, it seems to depend on
what the appropriate roles or functions of the agents or institutions are. For instance,
parents should ensure that each of their children develops into a capable adult, and this
will require helping them in proportion with their needs. The person awarding a music
prize should have the aim of promoting musical excellence and so should favor the
contestants who have produced the best performance. The function of the car pool is to
provide rides for its members and so it is relevant if some members contribute more to
that goal that others.
We should be skeptical, then, about whether there is a general rule for
determining whether a given instance of favoring some people over others is
inappropriate. We should expect that there is no principle that applies across the board
to tell us which differences between people are relevant or provide an appropriate basis
for favoring them differentially. But, as we have seen, we can still work out what is
relevant in particular cases.
8.
What, then, does the state have to do in order to treat its citizens fairly? What
distinctions are relevant in this context? Which favorings and disfavorings are
appropriate? A number of deeply held shared convictions bear on this question,
including some quite abstract ideas about the relation between state and citizen and
some more concrete judgments about particular state decisions that we would consider
fair or unfair.
We can think of a political society as a cooperative association whose members
are the citizens. Citizens cooperate together by accepting a common set of rules for
interaction and doing so works to the advantage of each. The rules are made by a
central authority, the state, through collective decision, and these rules are binding on
the members.2 6
In some societies there have been different classes of membership in the political
community, different classes of citizen. For instance, in aristocratic societies,
individuals could be born into higher and lower political classes. Those born into the
higher classes were considered more capable of fulfilling the responsibilities of
citizenship and were also considered more worthy of civic benefits. In an aristocratic
society, the higher born are expected to fulfill civic duties, such as voting, from which
others are excluded and are also entitled to advantages that are denied to other
members of society. For instance, the higher born might be granted a more extensive
set of liberties, while other members are slaves or restricted in their freedom to practice
their religion. Or, the state might restrict access to certain economic goods, such as
land or desirable jobs, to only those born within the appropriate class.
In a liberal democracy, we have a very different conception of the relation
26 Rawls (1971) similarly suggests that citizens can be seen as members of a cooperative
association. I discuss this part of Rawls' view more fully in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
between state and citizen. We think of all citizens as being equal members of the polity,
all able to fulfill the responsibilities of membership, such as voting and upholding the
law, and equally entitled to civic rights and benefits. We think of all citizens as being
equal members of the polity, irrespective of their race, sex, social class, natural talent
and so on. We expect the state's treatment of its citizens to reflect this fundamental
equality of standing and hence we expect the state to treat differences of race, sex and
so on between citizens as irrelevant.27
These more abstract convictions about the relation between state and citizen are
reflected in some of our more specific expectations about how the state ought to relate
to the citizens. 28 We think, for instance, that no citizen should be granted special
exemptions from the law (that there should be, as we say, "equality before the law").
We think that each citizen should be equally well protected by the police, regardless of
their race, wealth or talent. We think that there should be equal liberties of religion and
conscience for citizens with different religions and moral views.
Thus, the equal status of every citizen as a member of the polity seems to
require that the state favor each citizen equally, at least in the context of fundamental
decisions about the "basic structure" of a society, its central social and economic
27 What I say is one interpretation of Rawls' remarks that citizens are viewed as "free and equal" in
a liberal democracy. See Rawls (1971). Also, see Dworkin (2001), who claims that the state must
show "equal concern for its citizens".
28Here I draw on Cohen (1989).
institutions. 29 Differences between citizens of race, sex, social class, natural talent and
so on are irrelevant in this context and are not an appropriate basis for differential
treatment. We have seen what this means for goods such as police protection and so
on. What does it mean for justice in the distribution of resources?
9.
Among the functions we expect the state to perform include putting in place
various economic structures. We expect the state to create and protect property rights,
maintain a stable system of contract law, foster competition through anti-trust laws, and
take various other measures that are needed to create a working economy for the
benefit of the citizens. The state's role in maintaining a working economy is more
obvious during some periods than others, for instance it was particularly conspicuous
during the "bailout" to ensure that American financial institutions persist, but the state's
hand is there at all times. The state has important choices to make about exactly which
economic rules to enact and the choice of rules will profoundly affect the prospects
different citizens face for access to resources.
For instance, in an aristocratic society, of the sort I mentioned earlier, certain
sorts of property and the best jobs might be legally restricted to those born within a
certain caste. These rules would obviously work to the advantage of the higher born.
Instead, the state might create a competitive market economy with no such legal
restrictions on access to jobs to property. In this case there would not be the obvious
29The term "basic structure" was introduced by Rawls (1971).
favoring of those born into particular classes that we see in an aristocratic society.
However, the income any individual can gain in the open market will depend on how
scarce and in demand her skills are. And what skills she has will depend substantially
on her class background and innate talents. So, this economic system could be said to
favor those born into wealthy families and with certain genetic endowments.
Another set of policies, those favored by so called "meritocrats," is designed to
ensure that individual prospects for wealth and income depend just on variations in
natural talent. Attempts are made to reduce the effects of class background on an
individual's prospects through such policies as heavy investment in public education
and heavy taxation of estates. This is an economic system that does not advantage
those born wealthy but does advantage those born with certain natural talents.
Finally, the state might have, in addition to a market economy, certain
redistributive policies, such as having some form of welfare state, progressive taxation
and so on. These policies would reduce the effect of both social class and natural talent
on an individual's prospects and generate more equal prospects for every citizen.
These are just a few, briefly articulated, policy options. But they will suffice to
illustrate the fact that the distribution of wealth between citizens depends substantially
upon what rules the state chooses to enact. Different sets of policies will work to the
advantage of citizens with different characteristics, such as those born into wealthy
families, those with greater natural talents and so on.
Some people will accept that state decisions have an important impact on the
distribution of wealth, but will claim that this impact ought to be measured against the
baseline of individuals' pre-tax incomes, as determined by the operations of the "free
market". For example, some people favor a flat tax rate on the grounds that it involves
the government imposing a similar percentage burden on each citizen. These people
are assuming that the burdens the government imposes on any citizen have to be
measured against a baseline of her pretax income.
For their view to be coherent, we have to think of pre-tax income levels as being
fixed independently of government policies. Only then would it make sense to use pre-
tax incomes as a baseline against which to measure the impact of government policy on
distribution. In fact, however, the state is heavily involved in the process that
determines citizens' pre-tax incomes.
To see this, consider the property rights individuals have, which play a large role
in determining pre-tax incomes. A "right to property" in an item consists in having
various Hohfeldian claims, privileges and powers. 30 These include, typically, the right to
use the item without interference by others, the right to transfer it to others as a gift or
bequest and the right to some of the income that it can be sold for.
Each of these rights associated with property is created and enforced by the
state. For instance, the state decrees that some item of physical capital is to be
controlled exclusively by a particular individual and prevents others from using it. The
state decides whether an item may be passed on as a bequest and whether or not the
police will intervene when someone tries to bequeath it. And the state decides whether
3 See, for instance, Thomson (1992).
the owner may receive income from the sale of the item.3 1
Furthermore, there are various decisions to be made about the precise details of
these rights. For instance, the state must say when a will is needed for successors to
receive an inheritance and what the content of such a will must be. The state decides
exactly how much of the income from the sale of an item should accrue to the seller.
Thus, I think it will not do to take the pre-tax distribution of wealth as a baseline
against which we measure the effects of state policy. That distribution is itself heavily
determined by state measures. State decisions determine both the pre-tax and post-tax
distribution of wealth and hence have a pervasive impact on the resources that citizens
hold.
10.
Now, we saw earlier that in the context of fundamental state decisions about the
social and economic structure of a society, differences between citizens, such as their
race, social class and natural talents, are irrelevant and should not be a basis on which
some citizens are favored over others. The state must favor its citizens equally. Thus,
if the economic rules the state enacts are working, say, to the advantage of those that
are born in higher social classes, then there is a complaint of unfairness that can be
made by those born into lower classes, namely that they are being inappropriately
disfavored by the state.
3 The idea that these rights are created by the state will be resisted by Lockeans such as Nozick (1974) but it
would take us too far afield to discuss their arguments in detail.
We are now in a position to see the basic argument for egalitarian policies on the
Fair Treatment View. The state makes rules that govern the basic structure of a
society, including rules about the structure of the economy. It has choices to make
about which rules to adopt and the choice of rules has a pervasive impact on the
distribution of resources.
But, as matter of fairness, the state must favor its citizens equally because, in the
context of fundamental state decision making, all citizens are relevantly similar. So,
when rules are chosen such that some citizens have greater resources than others,
those who fare less well can complain that the state has benefitted them less, and
hence treated them unfairly. Thus, unless inequalities can be given a special
justification, the rules ought to be chosen with the aim of benefiting each citizen equally.
The relationship between state and citizen is an ongoing one, so the aim should
not be that every economic decision at every moment favor every citizen equally but,
rather, that the overall economic structure work over time to ensure that each citizens
has roughly equal prospects for earning income and wealth, unless inequalities can be
given a special justification.
Here is the argument in summary:
1. X treats Y unfairly if X favors Z over Y and there is no relevant difference
between Y and Z.
2. In the context of state decision making, differences between citizens are
irrelevant.32
32 This premise and, hence, premise 3 need to be qualified so that they only concern fundamental state decisions
about the basic structure. Individual policies may permissibly favor some citizens over others. I leave out the
qualification in the text to make the argument clearer.
Thus, from 1. and 2.
3. The state must not favor some citizens over others, it must favor its citizens
equally.
4. Decisions made by the state have a pervasive impact on the distribution of
wealth in a society.
Hence
5. Inequalities of wealth reflect decisions by the state which benefit some citizens
more than others.
Therefore, from 3 and 5,
6. Conclusion: Inequalities of wealth issue from unfair treatment of some citizens
by the state.
This is my first pass at the argument, but I think it needs to be revised slightly in
light of an important objection, which I will now present. The problem, according to the
objection, is with premise 3. It is true, the objector says, that the state must treat its
citizens equally in making basic structural decisions. But it is not the case that to treat
its citizens equally the state must ensure that they have equal resources . Rather the
state must favor its citizens equally with respect to some other goods or rights, such as
equal liberties.
The reasoning behind the objection is as follows. State policy ought to be made
by considering the goods different policies would bring for citizens. However, not all
goods are proper objects of state concern. There is some special set of goods which it
is appropriate for the state to focus on. For instance, many people have thought that
individuals benefit from living piously whilst denying that a state should be concerned
with ensuring that individuals live piously. Some have said that a state is responsible
for ensuring that its citizens have freedom of speech whilst denying that a state should
be concerned with the ability of its citizens to express their ideas well or draw a crowd.
Let's call the set of goods the state ought to be concerned with the "political goods". 33
It is unfair if the state favor some citizens with respect to political goods. But is
not unfair, according to the objector, if the state favors some citizens over others with
respect to goods that are not political goods. Thus, the objector's suggestion is that
premise 3 must be revised so that it says:
3*: The state must favor its citizens equally with respect to their holdings of
political goods.
If we revise premise 3 in this way, which I think we should, then the inference
from 3 and 5 to 6 must be questioned. It is only valid if resources are a primary good.
An objector could deny that resources are a political good and hence resist the
conclusion that inequalities of resources are the result of unfair treatment.
Any example of such reasoning may found in a number of supreme court
decisions. For instance, in Rodriguez the court had to evaluate school funding policies
that resulted in education of different quality for students living in different areas.
Because of the funding policies, poorer quality public education was offered to children
in poorer areas. The court ruled, roughly, that despite their receiving a lower quality
public education, children in the poorer areas had not been treated unfairly by the state.
Simplifying somewhat, an important argument in the majority opinion was that
33 What I call "political goods" are similar to Rawls' "primary goods", at least he used the term in
later works. For instance, Rawls (1996), on p.179, tells us that an index of primary goods provides
a "conception of citizens' needs - that is, of persons' needs as citizens". I think what he had in
mind in this passage is roughly the idea I describe in the text.
education, except up to a minimal level, is not a political good or not among the goods
that the state must be centrally concerned with providing for its citizens.34 The court
majority agreed that an individual's educational level is very important to her life
chances and well-being.35 But it denied that this importance is enough to make it a
political good.36
We need to consider, then, whether resources are a political good so that we can
evaluate whether inequalities of resources within a state are unfair. How could we show
that resources are a political good? Agreeing with the supreme court, I do not think it
will suffice to point out that having resources is important to an individual's life
prospects. However, I think the following considerations make it plausible to think that
resources are a political good.
The policies that we expect a government to enact include creating a working
economy. In liberal democracies, it is usually expected, in particular, that a government
will have policies which support a market economy such as the creation of private
property rights, the enforcement of contracts, limited liability rules for certain firms and
so on.
Given that we think creating and maintaining an economy is a core function of
34 In the court's vocabulary, education was deemed to not be a "fundamental right".
35 We are in complete agreement with the conclusion of the three-judge panel below that "the
grave significance of education both to the individual and to our society" cannot be doubted.'
36 "But the importance of a service performed by the State does not determine whether it must be
regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause.'
government, we can ask what the rationale is for these policies. Why is it that a
government should perform these economic functions? A very plausible answer is that
having these policies creates wealth and hence results in citizens having resources.
Thus, it seems that the state should be concerned with ensuring that its citizens have
resources. It seems that resources are a political good.
Thinking about the economic functions of government in this way is also
attractive because it allows us to give a more unified rationale for some of the various
functions we expect the state to perform. Some of these functions, as we have seen,
include creating and supporting an economy. Another core function of government is
protecting a set of core liberties for citizens, such as freedom of religion, freedom of
speech, freedom of association and so on.
Take freedom of speech. Whatever benefit there is to an individual from having
freedom of speech is increased by her possessing resources. Having formal freedom of
speech provides her with an opportunity to speak without interference. With more
resources she is better placed to exercise that opportunity. For instance, with her
freedom of speech protected, an individual can publish pamphlets about politics, sex or
religion without having the police or other citizens interfere with her. However, this
opportunity to publish without molestation is much more useful to her if she has the
resources to actually produce and disseminate the pamphlets.
Thus, whatever rationale there is for ensuring that individuals have freedom of
speech extends to ensuring that they have resources. Hence, if we think, as I
proposed, that the economic functions of the state are justified by their role in helping
citizens obtain resources, then those functions can be given the same rationale as
provision of liberties. Both the state's economic functions and its liberty providing
functions could be given a common basis. This would be attractive and is a further
reason to think of resources as a political good.
Thus, by relying on requirements of fair treatment, in this case the requirement
that the state treat its citizens fairly, we can argue for an egalitarian view about
distributive justice. We can argue that inequalities are unjust, or unjust unless they can
be given a special justification, because they issue from unfair treatment of some
citizens by the state.
There remain a number of important questions and problems for the egalitarian.
For instance, I have said nothing about how considerations of freedom and
responsibility might fit into this picture. And, of course, there are large empirical
question about exactly which policies will satisfy the broad principles I have suggested,
although it seems very likely that some intervention to correct the inequalities of a
competitive market economy willbe needed. What I hope to have given you is an
account of how I think the basic fairness based case for egalitarianism should be made.
We can avoid the problems of relying on "cosmic unfairness," as the Luck Egalitarian
does, to justify an egalitarian view and, instead, adopt the Fair Treatment View.
11.
So far, we've been discussing distributive justice within the context of an
individual society. I've defended a view about how best to defend egalitarian policies in
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that context by appealing to fairness. I'm now going to turn to the implications of what
I've said so far for distributive justice in the global sphere. Distributive justice in this
sphere concerns the distribution of wealth across political borders, between different
societies or between the individuals that inhabit different societies.
One clearly important duty when considering the global sphere is the duty of
humanitarianism that I mentioned at the beginning of this paper. Huge portions of the
world's population live in conditions of immense poverty and, in so far as this is
possible, we should be doing something about this (though it is difficult to know how).
This duty is not my main focus in this paper, though it is an important duty in this
context.
Political philosophers have asked whether there is more to the morality of global
wealth than considerations of humanitarianism. They have considered whether in
addition to considerations of humanitarianism there are also considerations of fairness
or justice that arise in the global context. In particular, they have asked what principles
of global justice an egalitarian about domestic justice is committed to.
So, what does a commitment to egalitarianism in the domestic sphere commit
you to globally? Well, it all depends on what the justification for egalitarianism in the
domestic context is. Suppose we defend domestic egalitarianism as the luck egalitarian
does, by appealing to cosmic unfairness. If we take this route, then we willbe
committed to applying the same principles of justice in the global sphere as we do at
home.
The animating idea behind luck egalitarianism is that it is unfair for someone to
have less than someone else through no fault of their own. But, clearly, being born in
one country rather than another is not something for which an individual can be held
responsible. So, if some people have less than others simply because they are born
into one society rather than another, this is unfair by luck egalitarian standards. Thus,
on the luck egalitarian view, state borders are irrelevant in determining which
distributions of income and wealth are unjust. Whatever sort of equality we demand at
home must also be demanded across the globe.
A number of theories of global justice have been developed along these lines, for
instance, in the recent work of Simon Caney and Kok-Chor Tan.37 If my earlier
arguments are correct, then these authors are making a mistake. I have suggested that
we should not rely on the idea of cosmic unfairness to justify egalitarianism in the
domestic context. If this is right, then Caney, Tan and others are resting their theories
of global justice on a mistaken view about what fairness requires of us. Their
arguments for extending egalitarian principles directly from the domestic sphere to the
global are thus unsound. This doesn't necessarily mean that global egalitarianism is
wrong, but that it would need a very different defense.
What about my own view about how to defend egalitarianism within a society?
What are the implications of my Fair Treatment View for global justice? I argued that a
theory of distributive justice should rely centrally on the notionfair treatment. The duties
we have of distributive justice, I suggested, are duties to treat people fairly. In
particular, I argued that for a state to treat its citizens fairly, it must enact economic
37 Caney (2006) and Tan (2004).
policies that work to the equal advantage of each citizen. This was because, I claimed,
there is a more general requirement that a state favor its citizens equally.
Clearly, this argument for why the state must ensure roughly equal economic
prospects for its citizens does not entail a duty for the state to ensure such prospects for
all persons, since the state is not required to favor all persons equally. Furthermore, in
the absence of a global state, there is no institution at the global level that would be
subject to the same requirements of fairness as the states we know.
Thus, on my view we cannot develop a theory of global justice by just taking
whatever principle of distributive justice we endorse domestically and applying them
straightforwardly in the global context. So that simple approach to global justice must
be abandoned.
This might seem to push us towards another simple approach to global justice.
This view, at the opposite extreme to the luck egalitarian view, is the position, recently
defended by Tom Nagel and Michael Blake, that there are no considerations of
distributive justice in the global sphere.38
I think this approach is also mistaken. All that we have seen so far is that we
should not think the same principles of distributive justice apply at the global level as
apply within a state. This leaves open the possibility that some other, perhaps quite
different, considerations of justice do apply in the global sphere. And, under conditions
of globalization where there are new institutions, cooperative relations between states
and so on, it is very plausible to think that some consideration of justice do apply in the
38 Blake (2001) and Nagel (2005).
global sphere. 39 In particular, it is plausible to think there willbe requirements of fair
treatment.
In the remainder of this paper, I am going to illustrate how such requirements
might be invoked, by looking at the World Trade Organisation (WTO). I am not going to
develop here a full theory of justice for the WTO, let alone of global distributive justice
more generally. I'm just going to show how requirements of fair treatment may apply to
decisions made in the WTO and hence illustrate how, on the Fair Treatment View,
considerations of justice can arise in the global sphere. This willbe some evidence for
my suggestion that by relying on the idea of fair treatment we can have a theory of
distributive justice which says neither that the same distributive norms apply in the
global sphere as in the domestic one, nor that distributive norms only apply in the
domestic sphere.
12.
The WTO is an organisation within which various member states negotiate a
common set of rules governing terms of trade. Essentially, the aim of the organisation
is to help encourage trade across political borders and lower barriers to it. Of course,
though this is not always emphasised, increasing the volume of trade is not an end in
itself. The justification for trade is that it is supposed to bring with it various economic
benefits to the countries involved, including greater productivity, growth and
development.
39Cohen and Sabel (2006) make similar points in reply to Nagel.
So, the members of the WTO are part of a cooperative enterprise for the sake of
benefits to all and the benefits are created through the existence of a shared set of rules
that are enacted by and apply to all the members. But different sets of rules will have
quite different impacts on countries of different kinds. In other words, some rules will
favor countries of one kind and other rules will favor countries of another sort. Members
can thus question whether the rules that they are being asked to sign up for are
inappropriately favoring or disfavoring them. Thus, it is plausible to think that questions
about fairness of treatment should arise here; questions about whether the rules that
are being enacted inappropriately favor some countries over others.
And sure enough, such questions are raised in ongoing political debates. Take,
for instance, Joseph Stiglitz's criticisms of existing trade rules.4 Stiglitz argues that the
rules which have been enacted have typically worked disproportionately to the
advantage of richer, and hence more powerful, countries over poorer ones and he offers
two main grounds for this view.
Firstly, he argues that previous trade regimes have imposed special costs on
developing countries and hence disadvantaged them. The costs are due to the
difficulties that developing countries have in maintaining full employment. A rule that
requires member states to drop their tariffs with respect to certain goods, says Stiglitz,
should have relatively few costs (and many benefits) to a developed country. Increased
competition with foreign firms may mean that some domestic business willbe forced to
close. But, perhaps with some help from the government, it should be possible for their
4 Stiglitz, and Charlton (2005).
workers to move into new jobs, in more productive sectors.
In developing countries, according to Stiglitz, the situation is quite different.
Workers who are laid off due to increased competition do not typically end up in new,
more productive employment. They simply remain unemployed. And significantly
increased unemployment is a huge cost for a developing country.
Secondly, Stiglitz argues that previous WTO rounds have negotiated settlements
where the benefits from trade have mainly accrued to developed countries. In
particular, he suggests that there has been much greater reduction in tariffs for goods
that developed countries have an interest in exporting, while there are still large tariffs
and subsidies in the developed world for goods that developing countries have an
interest in exporting, such as agricultural produce and labour intensive manufactured
goods.
Thus, according to Stiglitz, previous rounds of trade negotiations have resulted in
decisions that have favored developed countries over developing ones, because they
have imposed special costs on developing countries and because their benefits have
been mainly to developed countries. And this, he claims, is unfair. The unfairness he
claims to have identified is unfairness of treatment. The rules that have been enacted in
the WTO, he claims, have inappropriately favored some members over others.
Why have developed countries been favored? Mainly, Stiglitz suggests, because
of their superior bargaining power, their better access to information, the larger teams
they can send to the negotiations and so on. In short, the developed countries are more
powerful and trade deals have favored the more powerful. This, we might say, is
inappropriate because having a better bargaining position is plausibly not something
that makes one country relevantly different to another in this context: it is not a reason
for favoring one country over another in deciding which set of rules to adopt.
Oxfam has made similar complaints about the WTO, such as those published in
their "Rigged Rules and Double Standards". Their concern is also with unfair treatment.
For instance, they write: "The international trading system is not a force of nature. It is a
system of exchange, managed by rules and institutions that reflect political choices.
Those choices can prioritise the interests of the weak and vulnerable, or the interests of
the wealthy and powerful."'1
Of course, there are very substantial empirical assumptions behind the claims of
Stiglitz and Oxfam and this is not the place to defend those. Many economists, I
recognise, will disagree with their claims. My point is just to illustrate the Fair Treatment
View, to show that a plausible looking argument about injustice in the global sphere can
be made by relying on requirements of fair treatment, in this case fair treatment of
members of the WTO by the decision making body.
Those who resist Stiglitz' claims, on normative grounds, can also often be seen
making arguments about fair treatment. For instance, economist T.N. Srinivasan claims
that even ifWTO decisions have typically favored the developed countries, this has still
not been unjust. He writes of Stiglitz' complaints that "it is not obvious why the share of
benefits from an agreement that accrues to poorer countries necessarily has to rise for it
to be fair. Why is an agreement, which delivers a Pareto improvement over the status
41 Oxfam (2002).
quo in the sense of benefiting every member of the WTO but in which a large share of
the benefits accrue to richer countries, unfair?"42 Srinivasan's suggestion is that fairness
just demands that WTO decisions give some weight to the interests of each member
country, even if some countries are favored more than others. But he is not disagreeing
that there is some sort of requirement of fair treatment involved here, just disagreeing
about the interpretation of that requirement. And it is consistent with his argument that
a different requirements of fairness would play a role in the domestic setting.
Hopefully these reflections will be enough to convince you that requirements of
fair treatment have a significant role to play in the global sphere and, indeed, are
already playing an important role. This suggests that even if we abandon appeals to
cosmic unfairness we can still have a theory according to which there are some
significant constraints of justice beyond the borders of the state. We just need a
more subtle approach than the existing ones, which simply take egalitarian principles
designed for application in the domestic sphere and apply them directly to the global.
We need to pay closer attention to the existing and evolving global institutions,
cooperative arrangements and so on to consider how requirements of fair treatment
can constrain them.
42 Srinivasan (2005), p. 12 .
(See end of chapter for abbreviations.)
Chapter 3: Contractualism, Politics and Morality
1.
John Rawls' theory of justice is known as a "contractualist" theory because it
employs a thought experiment about what social arrangements people would agree to,
or contract into, under certain special conditions. The theory was intended to explain
and issue in requirements of socialjustice. These are requirements on how a state
should design the central economic and social institutions of a society, what Rawls
called its "basic structure". (TJ pp. 6-10) These institutions include, for instance, the
structure of the economy, the system of fundamental rights given to citizens and so on.
Rawls' initial theory was thus limited in its application, applying only to questions about
political decision making.
However, Rawls suggested, as did others, that a contractualist theory might be
developed with application to a much larger set of moral questions. The thought
experiment about what people would agree to might be used, it was thought, not just to
settle how basic political decisions should be made but how people should act more
generally. This broader theory would tell us when any given action is right or wrong.
We might call this a theory of "rightness". Such a theory was developed most fully by
Thomas Scanlon.
We can thus distinguish between contractualist theories of social justice, such as
Rawls', and contractualist theories of rightness, such as Scanlon's. And we can ask
whether it was a good idea to use the contractual model, first developed to settle
questions of social justice, to develop a theory of rightness more generally. In this
paper, I am going to argue that this was a bad idea, that there may be good reasons to
adopt a contractualist theory of social justice but that it is a mistake to adopt of
contractualist theory of rightness.
I proceed as follows. Firstly, I explain, drawing on Rawls, the most plausible
motivations for adopting a contractualist theory of socialjustice. Secondly, I argue that
those motivations do not support adopting a contractualist theory of rightness. Nor, I
claim, do some other motivations suggested by Scanlon. Thirdly, I show some
problems with using a contractualist theory of rightness to explain why some intuitively
wrong acts are wrong.
Before proceeding, I would like to qualify my aims in one respect. The idea of
appealing to a contract or "original agreement" to justify political arrangements did not,
of course, originate with Rawls. Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau all endorse some
version of this idea, though in seemingly quite different ways to Rawls. And there may
be other ways of deploying a contract thought experiment.
But I will focus just on the use that Rawls and Scanlon makes of the contract
idea. Scanlon, we will see, carries over to his theory of morality much of the structure of
Rawls' view of social justice and I will be concerned with this particular maneuvre. So,
my concern is just whether a broadly Rawlsian contractualist theory of morality, of the
kind Scanlon offers, is correct. It may yet be that there is a different theory that can be
reasonably called "contractualist" which would be a good theory of social justice and
morality more generally.
2.
In this section I am going to focus on Rawls' contractualist theory of justice and
the justifications for it. I will mainly be concerned with presenting the motivations that
Rawls himself offers for the theory in a plausible light, though I will not offer a full
defense of it.
Rawls' theory of 'justice as fairness" is addressed to the problem of political
decision making in a state. The problem is this. A state is a central decision making
authority which makes decisions about the structure of the central social and economic
institutions of a society. The state must enact rules governing the assignment of basic
rights to citizens, regulate the economy and so on. There are a range of choices the
state can make and different choices will have very different effects on the division of
benefits and burdens among the citizens. So, some moral criteria are needed for
making this choice. We need to know what is required for the state's choice to be just
or for it to enact a just set of rules.
Rawls' theory was developed, he tells us, primarily as a response and alternative
to utilitarian theories of social justice, and to understand his view it will help us to first
consider the utilitarian theory of social justice.43 According to the utilitarian theory, we
43 Notice that I am speaking here, as Rawls does, only of the utilitarian theory of justice and not of act utilitarianism,
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should evaluate different possible political choices according to their effects on the
aggregate "utility", or pleasure, experienced by citizens. One choice is to be preferred to
another if produces greater aggregate utility. The just decision is the one that produces
the greatest possible aggregate utility.
Why might an alternative be needed to utilitarianism? One potential problem with
utilitarianism is that it seems to provide a poor explanation for some strongly held
convictions we have about what justice requires . For instance, according to
utilitarianism it is permissible to deprive some individuals of basic liberties, such as
freedom of religion and speech, if doing so will lead to sufficient benefits for the majority.
But we think that individual rights must be protected, even if such benefits could be
gained.
According to Rawls there is an explanation for why utilitarianism has these
untoward consequences. The utilitarian theory of justice, Rawls says, is "inconsistent
with the idea of reciprocity implicit in a well ordered society" and "incompatible with the
conception of social cooperation among equals for mutual advantage". (TJp. 13) What
is this idea of reciprocity and this conception exactly?
Rawls' thought seems to be along the following lines. Citizens in a state are not
merely passive recipients of benefits. The goods that a state makes available, such as
resources, security and so on, are only made available through the efforts of its citizens.
Citizens do their part in making these goods available by following the law, serving in
which is a theory of rightness. For the remainder of this section, where I use the term "utilitarianism" it always to
refer to the former and not the latter.
armed forces, serving on juries and performing other civic duties. It thus seems
appropriate to think of a political society, consisting of a state and citizens who
contribute in these various ways, as a cooperative association.
Furthermore, once we think of a political society as a cooperative association, it
is plausible to suppose that norms of reciprocity will play an important role. That is to
say, once we think of citizens as cooperators who jointly make certain goods available, it
is plausible to think that there will a moral requirement that each citizen get something in
return for her participation. Each citizen ought to gain a fair share of the benefits of the
association.
So, Rawls' suggestion is that a political society can plausibly be thought of as a
cooperative association whose members are its citizens and that these members are
thus each owed a fair share of the benefits of the association. A fundamental moral
requirement on political decision is that they ensure each citizen gets her fair due as a
cooperating member.
We can now see why utilitarianism, according to Rawls, is in "conflict" with the
conception of a political society as a cooperative association and with accompanying
ideas of reciprocity. Once we take those considerations into account, we see that a
fundamental moral requirement on political decisions is that they ensure each citizen
gets her fair due as a cooperating member of society. But the utilitarian theory of justice
does not include such a requirement.
According to utilitarianism, all that is relevant, as a matter of justice, is the effects
of political decisions on the aggregate well-being of citizens. No weight is given to
ensuring that each citizen benefits appropriately, as long as the sum of well-being is
maximized. This explains why utilitarianism has untoward consequences, such as
requiring that we sacrifice the liberty of the few for the sake of greater benefits to the
majority. Utilitarianism has these untoward consequences because it gives no weight to
ensuring that each person's interests are promoted, except in so far as doing so will
promote aggregate well-being. Utilitarianism ignores the importance of political
decisions being fair to each citizen.
So, we have identified the core problem with utilitarianism, according to Rawls.
Utilitarianism mandates policies which are prima facie unjust, such as denying equal
liberties of speech and conscience to the few. And the reason why utilitarianism has
these unacceptable implications is that it gives no role to the requirement that citizens
be treated fairly in the allocation of benefits and burdens - that political decisions treat
them in ways that befit their status as cooperating members of society.
3.
Rawls' aim was to create a theory of justice that did not have these defects of
utilitarianism, one which did give a fundamental role to the requirement that citizens be
treated fairly by the state and which could thus explain intuitive precepts of justice such
as strong protections for individual rights.
Why, then, did he appeal to the idea of a "contract" or agreement between
persons, what he called an "original position", in his theory of justice? How could this
idea help capture the requirements of fair treatment that he was concerned to include in
his theory? Why didn't he just elaborate further on what is required for citizens to be
treated fairly and in a way that shows how that requirement explains some more specific
precepts of justice? Well, Rawls says that we could just do this, but he proposes that
the idea of the original position may be a useful "device" for helping us to work out more
clearly what treating citizens fairly amounts to. (TJ p.19) I'm now going to turn to that
device and how it might help us model the requirements that Rawls is concerned with.
To see the intuitive idea behind the original position, return to Rawls' criticisms of
utilitarianism. As we saw, Rawls objects that utilitarian policies may treat citizens
unfairly by requiring that they accept lower prospects than others just for the sake of
small benefits that this would bring for a multitude of other citizens. Now, consider such
a policy from the perspective of a citizen who is being asked to accept the lesser
prospects. This citizen seems to have a legitimate complaint against those who make
the policy. We can imagine her formulating the complaint as follows: "I see that this
policy will produce a sum of benefits for various others. But, hey, what about me! I am
being left out. I do my part as a cooperating member of society, but I am being asked to
accept less than others even though they do no more than me."
Thinking about the policy from the perspective of the person who loses out is,
perhaps, a useful way of seeing that it is unfair. By considering the complaint that this
person could legitimately make about the policy, we can see that it treats them unfairly.
This suggests a more general strategy for thinking about the fairness of state
policies. Perhaps we can think about whether or not a policy (or set of policies) is fair by
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thinking about what complaints any individual citizen could raise against it. If some
citizen has a legitimate complaint, then the policy treats her unfairly, but if no citizen
does then the policy is fair. Since citizens are equal members of society, each can
make the same complaints as another. Thus, Rawls proposes that we think about
fairness in policies by asking what "persons who view themselves as equals, entitled to
press their claims upon one another, would agree to". (p.13) The idea is that if a set of
policies would be acceptable to each citizen, then no-one would be treated unfairly were
we to enact them.
So, there is some motivation for using a thought experiment about what citizens
would agree to in order to work out which political decisions would treat citizens fairly.
By using a thought experiment about which policies would be acceptable to each
citizen, and hence agreed to by them, we can ensure that the policies we enact are fair
to each citizen or give each their due.
More needs to be said if this thought experiment is to be useful. For it to work, we
need to specify what grounds citizens can legitimately offer as a complaint. We need to
think about what counts as a good reason for complaint, so that we ensure the chosen
policies will give each citizen her due. And we also need to think about the limits on
what the parties can complain about, so that we don't reject a policy just because
there's an alternative which someone would prefer. Rawls specifies in more detail how
the thought experiment is to work, telling us what a citizen can complain about and how
we might place limits on what each can demand. He suggests that we proceed as
follows.
We imagine parties who will only accept a set of policies if the policies are in their
interests (Rawls discuss exactly which interests they are to consider, but we can ignore
this for now). This ensures that whatever policies are accepted will be in the interests of
each citizen and hence that, unlike in a utilitarian society, no-one will be left out.
But this still leaves the problem of placing limits on what parties in the thought
experiment demand, of ensuring that no-one demands more than their due. Rawls
ensures that there will be some such limits by placing further constraints on the thought
experiment. We are to imagine, he suggests, that the parties are subject to a "veil of
ignorance", which prevents any of them knowing exactly which person they are and from
knowing characteristics of themselves such as their race, sex, class and so on. All they
know is that they are a member of society and that they have certain interests. Since
they don't know any of their own particular characteristics, no party will demand special
benefits for themselves. Rather, the parties will choose policies that advantage each
citizen that will live under them, since each party will want to ensure good prospect for
themselves, whoever they turn out to be. We thus arrive at Rawlsian contractualism
about justice: the correct principles of justice are those that would be chosen by citizens
concerned to protect their fundamental interests from behind a veil of ignorance.
We can easily imagine other ways of constructing the thought experiment, which
also ensure that no citizen demands more than her due. One obvious thought would be
to suppose that the parties to the agreement are not just motivated by self-interest, but
also concerned to only demand what they can reasonably expect. On this way of
imagining the contract, the parties themselves accept that they, and other citizens, are
equal cooperating members of society and that hence that they should be willing to
accept the same benefits and burdens as others. Given this acceptance, they limit their
demands to only what can be ensured for other citizens also. No-one demands more
than her due as an equal member.
Rawls, at various points in "A Theory of Justice," touches on this alternative way
of constructing the contract thought experiment, though he does not opt for it in the end.
For instance, he at one point asks us to consider not what self-interested individuals
behind a veil of ignorance would agree to but what "persons who view themselves as
equals, entitled to press their claims upon one another, would agree to". (UJp.13)
Rawls calls this version of the contract thought experiment an "ethical variations" and I
will call it an "ethical variant"'. (TJp.514)
So, we have seen two versions of Rawlsian Contractualism about social justice.
The first, which is Rawls' considered view, is the following:
Rawlsian Contractualism (RC): A principle of justice is correct if it would be
agreed to by citizens concerned solely to advance their fundamental interests
and subject to a veil of ignorance.
The second version we have discussed does away with the veil ignorance as a
means of limiting what any party to the agreement will demand. Instead, the parties are
assumed to themselves limit their demands only to what is reasonable, given their
status as an equal member of society. This is the ethical variant of Rawlsian
Contractualism.
Rawlsian Contractualism - Ethical Variant (RC-EV): A principle of justice is
correct if it would be agreed to by citizens concerned to advance their
fundamental interests to the degree that is reasonable.
RC and RC-EV, we have seen, have a common motivation. In both cases, the
theory is motivated by a concern to work out what principles of justice for the regulation
of society must be used if its citizens are to be treated fairly. This concern for fair
treatment of citizens arises because citizens are equal members of society, each doing
their part as cooperators.
It might be asked what exactly, on Rawls' view, the relation is between what is
just, or fair, and what would be agreed to. Is he, for instance, saying that certain
arrangement are just because they would be agreed to? Or something weaker?
As I have been interpreting Rawls, RC and RC-EV are relatively weak claims.44
They don't constitute an anylsis of what justice is, they just tell us that a certain
conditional is true, namely that certain arragements are just if they would be agreed to
under certain circumstances. RC and RC-EV are supposed to be a useful heuristic for
working out what is fair, and hence just, in a set of social arrangements. They are
useful only in so far as we have a better grip on what would be agreed to under the
" Although, admittedly, it's not fully clear from Rawls' text what he in mind.
relevant circumstances than we do on fairness and, hence, justice.45
4.
Let us now turn to Scanlon's theory, which I will later compare with Rawls'. As I
said, in the introduction, Scanlon's aim is broader than Rawls': he hopes to provide a
theory of not just social justice, but morality more generally. Such a theory should tells
us not just what the correct principles of justice are but the correct principles for
evaluating all actions. I am going to call this a theory of' "rightness," a theory which tells
us when an action is right. Also, I am going to assume, as Scanlon does, that an action
is right just in case it is not wrong, so I will speak interchangeably about a theory of
'"rightness" and of "wrongness".46 Here is Scanlon's canonical statement of his theory of
rightness:
Scanlonian Contractualism (SC): An act is wrong if its performance under
the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general
regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for
45 I'm going to set aside the question of whether they really are a useful heuristic. The question seems especially
pressing with respect to RC-EV, because to apply RC-EV one needs to bring in substantial normative claims
about what is reasonable, whereas to apply RC one does not. But this difference will not be important for our
purposes.
* I don't mean to fully endorse this suggestion, but it will be a useful, for the sake of simplicity, to follow Scanlon
in making it.
informed, unforced, general agreement. (WWO, p. 153).
As it stands, this thesis may sound appealing but it is highly abstract and difficult
to evaluate in isolation. It is hence important important for us to understand how
Scanlon interprets it and intends us to apply it. Let us thus examine this formulation of
Scanlon's view to get clearer on what he has in mind.
According to Scanlon's formula, the rightness of an action is determined by facts
about "principles for the general regulation of society". What exactly does he have in
mind by such principles?
Let us say that a principle is a proposition of the form You ought/ought not to do
action A under conditions C. For instance, You ought to aid people when they are in
great need is a principle. What is it to consider a principle as a rule for "the general
regulation of behavior"? Scanlon seems to have a few conditions in mind.
Firstly, most people believe that the principle is true. Secondly, these people are
motivated to perform the actions that the principle requires. Thirdly, it is public
knowledge that the first two conditions are met. So, to evaluate a set of principles for
the general regulation of behavior, we have to imagine those principles being
implemented such that these three conditions are met.
To determine the rightness of an action, on Scanlon's view, we have to evaluate
possible rules for general regulation. How are we to evaluate a set of rules for general
regulation?
We start by considering what benefits and burdens for people would be produced
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if that rule was used for general regulation. For instance, to evaluate the rule You ought
not to steal from others, we consider what it would be like if most people accepted that
rule and so on. And we consider the benefits and burdens for people that would result
from this, such as protection for some people from the harms of theft and costs for those
who would otherwise gain from theft.
Having seen the consequences of adopting different sets of rules, how are we to
decide which should be adopted? We should choose those rules which no-one could
"reasonably reject" says Scanlon. I think that without any serious loss we can restate
Scanlon's claim in terms of acceptance of rules rather than rejection.4 7 When we do this,
Scanlon's claim is that rules for general regulation should be evaluated by considering
whether they would be accepted by reasonable people. And when we do this we can
see that Scanlon's procedure for evaluating rules is very close to the way we are
supposed to evaluate political policies according to the Ethical Variant of Rawlsian
Contractualism. Here, again, is that claim about social justice:
Rawlsian Contractualism - Ethical Variant (RC-EV): A principle of social justice
is correct if it would be agreed to by citizens concerned to advance their
47 Scanlon tells us in C& U and WWO that he focuses on reasonable rejection rather than acceptance because he
wants to avoid the possibility of arrangements being reasonably accepted by someone because they are
especially giving or self-sacrificing. But one could just as easily focus on acceptance and stipulate that none of
the parties to the agreement are self-sacrificing because they are concerned to advance their interests (as is done
in my formulation of RCEV). The "contract" is, after all, a thought experiment which it is up to us to design.
fundamental interests to the degree that is reasonable.
We saw in the last section that the point of requiring that political principles would
be accepted by reasonable citizens is to ensure that each citizen is treated fairly. We
imagine what would happen if the state enacted certain principles and the
consequences this would have for citizens. We ensure that the resulting benefits and
burdens each citizen would face are fair by considering whether any citizen would have
a reasonable complaint about them.
Similarly, on Scanlon's view, we evaluate a rule for general regulation by thinking
about the burdens and benefits it would produce and considering the '"weightiness of the
burden for those on whom it falls and the importance of the benefits it offers, for those
who enjoy them". (WWO p.208) We consider whether any individual has a reasonable
complaint against that rule being adopted, given the benefits and burdens that it would
impose on her. As on the Rawlsian view, the effect of doing this is to ensure that each
person would be treated fairly by the adoption of a rule, given the benefits and burdens
she would experience.
Just as Rawls' theory can be contrasted with the utilitarian theory of justice,
Scanlon's view can be contrasted with rule utilitarianism. According to the rule
utilitarian, we evaluate rules for general regulation solely by considering their effects on
aggregate utility or well-being. By contrast, Scanlon's account includes a constraint of
fairness because the rules are evaluated by considering the benefits and burdens they
would impose on each individual.
5.
So much for the basics of Scanlon's view, let us now consider whether there is
anything to recommend it. As with the Ethical Variant of Rawlsian Contractualism, to
apply Scanlon's formula we have to already have a significant grasp on what fairness
requires and, in particular, what counts as an "unreasonable" demand for a benefit or to
be freed from a burden. For this reason, a number of people have understandably
questioned whether Scanlon's theory is very informative.
But I am going to set aside this concern and suppose that we do have a good
grip on what makes for a "reasonable complaint". My focus is going to be on the broad
view of morality that Scanlon proposes rather than the details of his formula. According
to that broad view, we have seen, whether a moral principle is correct depends on the
benefits and burdens it would produce were it used as a rule for general regulation and,
in particular, on whether that distribution of burdens and benefits would be fair.
Rawls similarly thought, we saw earlier, that principles of social justice should be
evaluated by considering what would happen if we implemented them as general rules
(for regulating the basic structure) and, in particular, whether they would produce a fair
distribution of benefits and burdens for the citizens. Rawls justified this approach, we
saw, by appeal to the idea that a political society is a scheme of cooperation. The state,
on his approach, should be seen as a body which makes rules for a cooperative
scheme. Rawls suggested that because these rules are cooperative rules, which
citizens are expected to comply with for the common good, the rules ought to result in
each citizen benefiting fairly from the scheme and bearing only a fair share of its
burdens.
So, Rawls motivated his approach by appealing to the idea that principles of
social justice are principles for the regulation of a cooperative scheme. What about
principles of rightness? Can Scanlon similarly say that principles of rightness are
principles for the regulation of a cooperative scheme?
There certainly seem to be some cases where an action is wrong in virtue of
certain cooperative schemes being fair or unfair. For instance, people are sometimes
members of fair clubs, car-pools, business cooperatives and so on, and their
membership in these fair schemes creates obligations to perform certain actions, such
as paying club dues, fulfilling car poor duties and so on. In these cases, the correct
principles for regulating my actions will often be the fair rules for the schemes I am
involved in. For instance, I ought to pay my membership fees because Members ought
to pay their dues is a fair rule for the club to implement.
But there are also seem to be many moral obligations that are not tied to our
membership in fair cooperative schemes or what rules would be fair for such schemes.
For instance, it seems that I have an obligation not to kill others even if they are not
members of any cooperative association with me. If I meet an unknown, foreign person
in the desert I must not kill them arbitrarily, regardless of our lack of antecedent ties.
Similarly, it seems, for many other obligations, such as the obligation to keep promises,
to aid those in serious need, to not lie and so on.
On the face of it, then, there are large parts of our morality which have nothing to
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do with the fairness of cooperative schemes. The similarities between Scanlon's view
and Rawls' are thus puzzling. Rawls' view focuses on the fairness of general rules
because he thinks that the rules we need to regulate the basic structure are rules for the
regulation of a cooperative association. Scanlon's theory also focuses on the fairness
of general rules: which actions are right, he thinks, is determined by which general rules
are fair. But his theory cannot be motivated in the same way. The correct principles
governing individual actions do not seem to be rules for the regulation of cooperative
associations.
6.
So, why think that an action is wrong if it would be prohibited by the rules that
would be fair to use for general regulation? We saw in the last section that Scanlon's
view, whilst sharing much of the Rawlsian approach, cannot be motivated in the same
way as Rawls'. Is there an alternative motivation that Scanlon can offer for it?
One suggestion Scanlon makes is that it is natural to appeal to facts about rules
for general regulation one we see the role that principles play in ordinary moral
explanations of wrongness. In ordinary cases of moral judgment, Scanlon suggests, we
appeal to general principles to explain why certain actions are wrong. (WWO p.187)
For instance, suppose I hear that Jones killed Smith in North Cambridge today and that
Smith was wholly innocent: Jones killed him just for fun.
I would conclude that Jones' action was wrong and if someone asked me why it
was wrong I would likely appeal to a general principle. "Murder is wrong," I might say,
"and Jones murdered Smith." The general principle that murdering is wrong seems to
provide a good explanation for why the particular action is wrong.4 8
Given that principles have this role to play, we need to figure out which moral
principles are correct if we are to determine which actions are wrong. The evaluation of
principles, then, ought to be central moral theory. We, moral theorists, ought to be
concerned with working out what the correct set of moral principles is.
Scanlon infers from this that we should focus on whether those principles should
be used as rules for general regulation. But no such conclusion follows. It is one thing
to ask whether the principle Murder is wrong is a correct principle. It is quite another to
ask whether the principle Murder is wrong should be used as part of set of rules for the
general regulation of society. A range of extra considerations come into play when we
consider the latter question.
For instance, when we are considering whether to use a principle for the general
regulation of society we have to imagine, as I described earlier, that most people follow
the rule and that it is publicly known that they follow the rule. Various effects might be
produced by such common belief in a principle. Perhaps, for instance, levels of fear in a
society are reduced when it is known that most people will not kill. This might be a
reason for using the principle Murder is wrong for the general regulation of society.
48 Some recent writers, so called "particularists", such as Dancy (2006), have denied that general principles have
any important role to play in the explanation of why actions are wrong or why we judge them to be wrong. But
it seems to me that they do and, for present purposes, I'll grant Scanlon that they do.
It is not, however, a natural consideration to appeal to when we are just
discussing whether the principle Murder is wrong is correct. When considering that
question we usually think just about what is involved in a single individual performing an
act of killing another. We do not bring to mind what it would be like for everyone to
perform or not perform such acts or it to be publicly known that such acts are performed
or not performed.
7.
So far, then, we have seen just that moral explanation should focus on figuring
out what the correct moral principles are. But we have seen no reason for adopting
Scanlon's preferred way of evaluating moral principles, namely by considering whether it
would be fair to use them as part of a scheme for the general regulation of society.
What does Scanlon have to say in favour of his preferred method for evaluating
principles?
The most central idea that Scanlon appeals in his original paper and more recent
work is the importance of standing in "moral relations" to others. (C&U p.135) Scanlon
claims that the morality of right and wrong fundamentally concerns what relations we
stand in to other persons. An action is right or wrong in virtue of the relation to others
we would be in were we to perform it. (WWO p. 155) When we act rightly we put
ourselves into a kind of moral harmony with others. (WWO p.154) When we perform a
wrong action, doing so puts us in a defective relation with others.
There is some attraction to this suggestion, I think. Often, it seems to me, an action
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is wrong in virtue of the relation to others that performing it would put me in. For
instance, it seems to me that spreading malicious gossip about someone is wrong
because it would put me into a bad relation with the person whose reputation might be
tarnished by the gossip. I would be treating them with a lack of regard. Conversely,
actions also often seem to be required because the good relation they would put me in.
For instance, when someone has done you a favor, one often must do something in
return so as to be in the relation of showing her gratitude.
So, there is some plausibility to Scanlon's idea that relations with others are
fundamental to morality. Let us call this thesis the "relation thesis":
Relation Thesis (RT): An action is wrong if it would put us in into defective relations
with others.
What is the defective relation we stand in to others when we act wrongly? Scanlon
makes a few different suggestions. One suggestion he makes is that when we act
wrongly, we put ourselves in a relation to others such that they could '"reasonably object
to" (WWO p.155) what we are doing. In another formulation, the objectionable relation
is one where we are unable to "justify our actions to others on grounds that they could
not reasonably reject" (WWO p.154). He also suggests that these formulations connect
with the Kantian requirement that we must avoid being in relations with others where we
are treating them as "mere means". (MD Chapter 3.)
These suggestions have some plausibility. For instance, perhaps we can say that
the spreading of the malicious gossip is wrong because the victim of the gossip could
reasonably object to our doing it. Or, perhaps it is wrong because the victim could
reasonably reject any justification we could offer for spreading it; for instance, the cruel
pleasure it will bring us. Moreover, when we think we have acted rightly, we often say
such things as "I did all he could ask of me" or "No one had a right to complain about
that". These common phrases suggest that there is some moral importance to being
able to justify ourselves to others or to what they can, within limits, complain about in
our actions.
Here is the formulation Scanlon uses most often to express this idea:
Justifiability Thesis (JT): An action is wrong if it could not be justified to others on
grounds that they could not reasonably reject.
As I said, the Justifiability Thesis is supposed to be a more specific version of the
Relation Thesis. RT tells us that an action is wrong is wrong when performing it would
put us into a defective relation with others, or involve mistreating them. Thus, for
instance, stealing is wrong on this view because it would involve mistreating the person
from whom one steals.
But RT leaves open what exactly it takes to mistreat someone or be in a defective
relation with them. It seems me that there are many different ways of mistreating
people. For instance, we can mistreat people by disrespecting them, being cruel to
them, abusing their trust, showing them callous indifference and so on.
According to JT, these various ways of mistreating people are all instances of one
basic way: treating them in ways that cannot be justified to them. Kant similarly claimed
that there is one fundamental way of mistreating others: treating them as a means and
not as ends in themselves.
I don't wish to fully evaluate RT or JT here, just to briefly indicate the most plausbile
way to understand and motivate them. My main aim here is to consider whether either
of them support Scanlon's contractualism.
So, does RT or JT support the idea that the wrongness of individual acts depends on
whether we would treat people fairly by implementing certain rules for the general
regulation of society? As the examples we have looked at illustrate, the intuitive idea
behind RT and JT is that there is some moral importance to being in certain
relationships with other people. The relevant relationships are between oneself and
particular other persons. As Scanlon himself says, "When we think of those to whom
justification is owed, we naturally think first of the specific individuals who are affected
by specific actions". (WWO p.202) But, as we have seen, Scanlon's final contractualist
formulation requires that we judge actions not by looking at how we would treat
particular people in performing them but by considering how we would treat people
generally by adopting general rules prohibiting those actions.
It thus seems to me that RT and JT support a very different way of thinking about
morality from Scanlon's contractualist view. On Scanlon's account, we should evaluate
putative moral principles by considering the benefits and burdens they would produce
for people were we to use them for the general regulation society. However, RT and JT
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suggest a very different way figuring out which principles are correct. We could instead
evaluate principles by considering directly whether the actions that they permit or
require would put us into defective relations with others. Call this the "Moral Relations
Approach".
As an example, take the principle You should not tell lies. We could evaluate this
principle by thinking about whether lying to someone puts one in a defective relationship
to them. Plausibly, it does: when you lie to someone you mistreat them.
There is room for discussion about the manner in which you mistreat someone when
you lie to them. Perhaps you show them disrespect, violate their autonomy or abuse
their trust. Perhaps, as according to JT, you treat them in manner that could not be
justified to them. It might be said, for instance, that lying to someone cannot be justified
to them because the aims of the liar cannot be shared by the person who is lied to.49
Whichever fuller account we given, the fact that lying to someone is mistreating them
seems like a perfectly good reason to think that lying is wrong. And it is a reason we
can see without thinking at all about the benefits and burdens produced by using a
principle prohibiting lying as a rule for the general regulation of society.
In the last section we saw that Scanlon's approach cannot be motivated in the way
that Rawls' is and so we have been looking for an alternative motivation. In this section
we have seen he fails to provide such a motivation. We have also seen that some of the
main ideas he appeals to, captured in RT and JT, not only fail support contractualism
but instead suggest an alternative, namely the Moral Relations Approach.
4 Kant (1948), p.70 makes this suggestion about the relation between the liar and lied-to.
In what follows, I am going to focus in more detail on an example of a wrongful
action to illustrate the difference between a Scanlonian contractualist explanation and
the sort of explanation we might offer on the Moral Relations Approach. In doing so, I
hope to also show that the latter has important advantages over the former.
8.
Let us briefly remind ourselves of how we judge that an action is wrong on Scanlon's
view. As we have seen, Scanlon tell us that the wrongness of an action depends on
whether we would be treating people fairly were we to implement rules for general
regulation that prohibited that action. How can we figure out which rules would be fair to
use for this purpose?
The implementation of one rule for general regulation rather than another has
benefits for some people and imposes burdens on others. There are, Scanlon tells us,
typically two classes of people whose interests are at stake when we are considering a
rule that constrains certain actions. so Firstly, there are some people who will benefit
from the restriction. For instance, a rule prohibiting harming others would benefit those
who would otherwise suffer harm. Secondly, there is the burden placed on those whose
actions are restricted by the rule. For instance, implementing a rule prohibiting harming
will result in agents having to organize their lives so as to avoid inflicting harm and will
50 "I maintained above that in considering whether a principle could reasonably be rejected we should consider the
weightiness of the burdens it involves, for those on whom they fall, and the importance of the benefits it offers, for
those who enjoy them, leaving aside the likelihood of one's actually falling in either of these two classes." WWO
p.208.
result in some not engaging in harmful activities which they might have enjoyed.
Rule utilitarians also focus on the benefits and costs for individuals of
implementing certain rules. But the contractualist view is different from the rule
utilitarian one because it brings in the idea of '"justifiability to each". As I showed earlier,
the usefulness of this idea of justifiability to each is in helping to model requirements of
fairness. The rule utilitarian view just requires us to look at the aggregate benefits of
implementing one rule rather than another. By contrast, the contractualist view requires
us to consider the effects of the rule from the perspective of each affected person, so
that no individuals are left out, even for the sake of aggregate welfare.
As an example, let us consider how a contractualist might account for the
wrongness of manipulation or deception. As a working definition, let us say that
deception occurs when someone intentionally leads another person to believe that p,
despite his knowing that p is false.
Here is an example of deception. Suppose that I am planning to apply for a job
at the button factory. I know an acquaintance, Sid, would also like to apply for the same
job. Sid asks me, "Do you know if the button factory has advertised for a position yet?"
"No," I say, trying to prevent him getting an application in on time, "I don't think they will
be advertising a job for some months yet." This seems like a case of wrongfully
deceiving somebody. Despite the potential gains to me of deceiving Sid, it is not
permissible for me to do so.
Why is it wrong for me to deceive Sid? What can the contractualist say to explain
its wrongness? We must consider the effects of implementing the rule It is wrong to
deceive others.
In favor of implementing the rule, there are the benefits it would bring for those
who are protected from being deceived. For example, in the case we just considered,
Sid has an important interest in not being deceived by me. Sid has various plans, such
as trying to pursue a satisfying career, and in order to pursue those plans he needs
accurate information about the world. If I deceive him, he receives inaccurate
information about the world and his ability to successfully carry out his plans is
thwarted.
But implementing the rule prohibiting deception would also impose costs on
some people. Some would benefit from being able to deceive others. For instance, I
would benefit from deceiving Sid. By misleading him I would increase my chances of
getting a job. There are also people, call them "third-parties", who would benefit from
other people's deceptive behavior. For instance, perhaps it is not me that wants the job,
but a friend, and so he would benefit from my deceiving Sid.
So, we have three different interests in play here. There are those who would
gain from deceiving, those who would be harmed by being deceived and there are
"third-parties" who would gain from someone else's acts of deceit. Given that a rule
prohibiting deceit affects these different interests, is it fair? Scanlon suggests that it is
fair because those who would benefit from the rule have greater reasons to prefer it
than those who are burdened by the rule have reasons to reject it.
What would make this the case? One suggestion Scanlon makes is that the
people who would benefit from the rule have a stronger interest in deception being
prohibited than others have in its being allowed. (WWO p.298-299) What he seems to
be saying is that the cost to an agent of being unable to deceive others, or to third-
parties who could gain from the deceit, is always less than the benefit a prohibition on
deceit brings to each individual who would otherwise be deceived.
But this seems false. Clearly, there are cases where A has a greater interest in
deceiving B than B has in not being deceived. For instance, in the example we
considered earlier, I might have more to gain from the job at the button factory than Sid
does and so I might have more to gain from deceiving him than he would have to lose
from being deceived.
It might be replied that even though in this particular case I stand to gain from
being able to deceive, still a rule allowing deception is likely to make me worse off over
the course of my life. For, it might be said, even though this rule alllows me to gain on
some occassions, it will result in me being deceived on other occassions, so that I would
be overall worse off.
It is true that any individual would likely lose out somewhat over the course of
their lives were a rule permitting deception implemented. But still, plausibly there will
be some people who would gain overall from it. Perhaps these people are particularly
good liars or perhaps they often find themselves in situations like the button factory
case where deception is very beneficial to them. As long as there are some such
people, Scanlon's explanation is in trouble. In any case, it seems to me very
implausbile to say that whether deceit is permissible should turn on whether such
people exist.
A second option for Scanlon is to say that even though in some cases a deceiver
has more gain from his deceit than a deceived person stands to lose, typically the costs
to the deceived person are higher. He might thus say that the rule prohibiting
manipulation should be preferred because it is better for more people.
But to take this route would be to abandon what is distinctive of contractualism.
As we have seen, the central feature that distinguishes contractualism from rule
utilitarianism is that the contractualist evaluates rules by reference to their effects on
each individual and not on aggregate well-being.
It is thus hard to see how appealing to fairness in the benefits and burdens
produced by general rules will explain why it is wrong to harm people through deceit
even when one would gain substantially from doing so or could benefit someone else
substantially through doing so, at least where the gains outweigh the harm done. There
are some people who would gain from a rule prohibiting deception in these cases and
others who would lose out. There seems to be no reason, grounded in fairness, for
favoring some of these people over others. All of their interests seem to be on a par.
A third option for Scanlon would be to claim that a rule allowing deception in the
cases we are discussing could be reasonably rejected because such a rule would allow
people to mistreat each other. A rule prohibiting deception, he might say, is different
because it does not allow mistreatment.
It does seem that when someone is mistreated when she is deceived. And, by
contrast, I am not mistreated when I refrain from deceiving someone else and nor are
third-parties mistreated when I refrain from acts of deception that would benefit them.
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So, appealing to claims about mistreatment does introduce a difference between
a principle that allows deception and one which does not. Only the former principle
permits people to deceive each other.
I suspect Scanlon would reject this way of explaining the difference between the
two principles. But in any event, I think it is unlikely to rescue contractualism. The fact
that I would be ill-treating others in performing actions of kind K is enough, by itself, to
show that (all else being equal) it is wrong to perform actions of that kind or that the
principle You should not perform actions of kind K is correct.
We could add that because performing K actions involves ill-treating others, rules
for general regulation that allowed those actions are reasonably rejectable. But it is
very unclear what we would gain from adding this. Doing so wouldn't, on the face of it,
give us any better or further explanation of why it is wrong to perform K actions. If we
take the proposed route, little seems to be gained from appealing to "reasonable
rejection" and so on at all. 1 The contractualist principle would be an unnecessary
"spare wheel" (as is sometimes said) in our moral theory.
This suggests that the Moral Relations Approach I introduced in the last section
might be more attractive than contractualism. On that approach, we can appeal directly
to facts about treatment and mistreatment to explain the wrongness of actions.
The contractualist thought experiment about what reasonable people could agree
to is helpful, I argued, for modeling requirements of fairness in the benefits and burdens
51 In other words, if we adopt the proposed version of contractualism, the traditional worry that the contractualist
formula is "redundant" comes to the fore. See, for instance, Pettit (2000), Blackburn (1999) and McGinn (1999).
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produced by general rules. If we stop using it for that purpose, it seems to have little
further use.
9.
To summarize what we have seen, a contractualist theory of social justice holds
some attraction because it allows us to model requirements of cooperative fairness that
are plausibly central to social justice. But such requirements are not central to morality
more generally, or rightness, and so a contractualist theory of rightness does not seem
promising. The central motivation Scanlon suggests for a contractualist theory of
rightness in fact points towards an alternative approach that I have very briefly
described: the Moral Relations Approach. We are further pushed towards such an
approach when we see the problems Scanlon's contractualism has with explaining the
wrongness of such actions as deception.
Finally, I would like to point out that Rawls can be seen as taking the Moral
Relations Approach. He tries to explain the wrong of social injustice by reference to one
way of ill-treating people, namely by enacting cooperative rules that are unfair to them.
His contractual thought experiment is supposed to help us model this particular
requirement on how we treat others. The lesson we might draw from Rawls then, is that
considerations of ill-treatment can be relied on to help us explain certain wrongs. But
we need not think that Rawls shows us the only way of mistreating others. Elsewhere in
this thesis I explore some different ways of mistreating others, such as treating them
unfairly and treating them ungenerously, and the relations between them.
Abbreviations
References to Rawls and Scanlon are largely in the text. I have used the following
abbreviations.
TJ: Rawls, J., 1999. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press)
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Tolerance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 103-28.
WWO: Scanlon, T.M., 1998. What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge: Harvard
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MD: Scanlon, T.M., 2008. Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning and Blame
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press)
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